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THE FORESEEABLE RISKS OF APARTMENT LIVING:
PENNSYLVANIA DEFINES A LANDLORD'S DUTY TO
PROVIDE SECURITY
I. INTRODUCTION
Only during the last two decades have courts extended a landlord's
tort liability to include injuries to tenants caused by the foreseeable
criminal acts of third parties.1 The courts' longstanding reluctance to
impose a duty of protection upon landlords has been founded on tradi-
tional property and tort concepts.2 In recent years, however, courts
have relied on a variety of theories to bring down the legal barrier that
for centuries has shielded landlords from such liability. As a result of
this change, some tenants have recovered from their landlords for inju-
ries inflicted by criminal intruders.3
1. See, e.g., Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969). In Ramsay, a
tenant sued her landlord for injuries resulting from a criminal assault that oc-
curred in her apartment. Id. at 510. The tenant alleged that the landlord had
maintained the building negligently and carelessly, in disregard of representa-
tions made at the beginning of the lease. Id. The court held that allegations that
the landlord had negligently maintained the premises and thereby had caused
the plaintiff's injuries precluded summary judgment in favor of the landlord. Id.
at 512. See also Comment, The Landlord's Emerging Responsibility for Tenant Security,
71 COLUM. L. REV. 275, 284 (1971) ("Ramsay went further than any case prior to
Kline [v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970)] in ex-
tending the lessor's duty to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal acts"). See
generally Moore, The Landlord's Liability to His Tenants for Injuries Criminally Inflicted
by Third Persons, 17 AKRON L. REV. 395, 395 (1984) (citing Comment, supra)
("Until [a]pproximately [f]ifteen [y]ears [a]go a landlord was never held civilly
liable to his tenants for injuries inflicted by the criminal acts of third
persons .. ").
2. For a discussion of the combination of tort and property law that has
shielded a landlord from liability, see infra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (liability imposed based on common area, special relationship, and
contract theories); Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 503 F. Supp. 1157
(D. Kan. 1980) (duty imposed on landlord to maintain security services in exist-
ence at beginning of lease which created an implied warranty of security);
Waitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494(1981) (landlord held liable for failing to repair defective lock based on special
relationship between landlord and tenant); O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees
Corp. Intercoast Management, 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977)
(liability imposed based on landlord's knowledge of foreseeable risk of criminal
assault); Graham v. M &J Corp., 424 A.2d 103 (D.C. 1980) (liability based on
failure to provide door locks in common areas); Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173
(D.C. 1977) (liability imposed for defective front door based on common area
theory); Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969) (summary judgment
for defendant denied based on failure to install front door lock); Ten Assocs. v.
McCutchen, 398 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (imposing duty on landlord to
take reasonable precautions against foreseeable criminal injury), review denied,
(627)
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In Feld v. Merriam,4 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the first
time 5 addressed the issue of a landlord's duty to protect his tenants
411 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1981); Whelan v. Docoma Enters., Inc., 394 So. 2d 506 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (liability imposed for defects in locking mechanism of plain-
tiff's apartment door); Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, 382 So. 2d 98
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (duty imposed because landlord charged tenant for
security but did not maintain security); Razden v. Parzen, 157 Ga. App. 848, 278
S.E.2d 687 (1981) (imposing duty on landlord to take reasonable precautions
against reasonably foreseeable criminal conduct); Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga.
App. 174, 210 S.E.2d 350 (1974) (imposing duty on landlord to use reasonable
or ordinary care to reduce unreasonable risk of criminal incident); Phillips v.
Chicago Hous. Auth., 91 111. App. 3d 544, 414 N.E.2d 1133 (1980) (landlord
may be liable to tenant if criminal assault results from condition of premises or
landlord's negligence in safeguarding premises), af'd, 89 Ill. 2d 122, 431 N.E.2d
1038 (1982); Stribling v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 34 Ill. App. 3d 551, 340 N.E.2d
47 (1975) (because facts made future criminal assault foreseeable, landlord had
duty to take reasonable precautions); Thompson v. Cane Gardens Apartments,
442 So. 2d 1296 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (landlord breached promise that security
measures would be provided); Day v. Castilow, 407 So. 2d 510 (La. Ct. App.
1981) (tenant may recover from landlord if she can prove landlord's conduct
facilitated concealed presence of intruders); Carline v. Lewis, 400 So. 2d 1167
(La. Ct. App. 1981) (landlord may be liable if security guard was not properly
performing his duty); Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976) (land-
lord may be liable if he fails to secure areas within his control against criminal
intrusion);Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 408 (1972) (landlord
may be liable for failing to reasonably secure common area against criminal in-
trusion); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224
N.W.2d 843 (1975) (followingJohnston); Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 NJ. 214, 412
A.2d 436 (1980) (landlord may be liable based on traditional negligence princi-
ples, breach of warranty of habitability, and breach of statute or ordinance);
Braitman v. Overbrook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975) (land-
lord may be liable for creating unreasonable risk of harm for his tenants); Miller
v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 506, 467 N.E.2d 493, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1984) (providing
locked doors falls within the state's function as landlord of dormitories at state
university); Loeser v. Nathan Hale Gardens, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 187, 425 N.Y.S.2d
104 (1980) (landlord has duty to take reasonable precautions to deter foresee-
able criminal conduct in common areas); Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp.,
47 A.D.2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1975) (landlord may be liable for failure to
repair lock on lobby door which allowed criminal access to building); Brown-
stein v. Edison, 103 Misc. 2d 316,425 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1980) (security provided by
landlord was within warranty of habitability to degree it was an essential service
for habitability); Skalski v. Baumholtz, 1 Phila. 332 (Pa. C.P. 1977) (landlord has
duty to take reasonable precautions against foreseeable crime), aff'd, 256 Pa.
Super. 595, 389 A.2d 208 (1978) (per curiam); Nixon v. Mr. Property Manage-
ment Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) (landlord may be liable for rape of 10-
year-old girl due to violation of city ordinance). For a discussion of the legal
theories utilized by courts to impose a duty of protection upon landlords, see
infra notes 36-113 and accompanying text.
4. 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984).
5. See id. at 397, 485 A.2d at 749 (ZapallaJ., concurring) ("We are called to
decide an issue of first impression."). In its decision below, the superior court
also stated that the case was one of first impression in Pennsylvania. 314 Pa.
Super. 414, 426, 461 A.2d 225, 231 (1983). The Pennsylvania Superior Court's
statement was not accurate, however. The superior court already had addressed
the question. See Skalski v. Baumholtz, 256 Pa. Super. 595, 389 A.2d 208 (1978)
(per curiam), aff'g 1 Phila. 332 (Pa. C.P. 1977) (landlord has duty to take reason-
2
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from the foreseeable acts of third parties. 6 The case arose from the
armed abduction of a couple in the garage of their apartment building.
7
The court 8 held that a landlord has no general duty to protect his ten-
ants from criminal intrusion, 9 but that a landlord may incur such a duty
if he provides a "program of security" in order to attract new tenants or
to keep existing tenants.' 0
The Feld court indicated that it did not wish to follow the modern
trend of imposing on landlords a duty to provide some type of security
for their tenants."1 Instead, the Feld court echoed the traditional view
able precautions against foreseeable crime). In addition, the Court of Common
Pleas of Lackawanna County had addressed this issue. See Kobeski v. Judkowitz,
57 Lack. Jur. 37 (Pa. C.P. 1955) (landlord has no duty to protect tenant from
criminal intrusion).
6. 506 Pa. at 390, 485 A.2d at 745. The court also addressed the scope of
the landlord's duty to protect his tenants from such foreseeable criminal acts.
Id.
7. Id. at 389, 485 A.2d at 744. For a further discussion of the facts of Feld,
see infra notes 114-34 and accompanying text.
8. Justice McDermott wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Justices
Nix, Flaherty, and Hutchinson. 506 Pa. at 388, 485 A.2d at 744. Justice Zappala
joined the majority, but also filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 397, 485 A.2d at
748-49 (Zappala, J., concurring). Former Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Papadakos and Lauser did not participate in the decision. Id. at 397, 785 A.2d at
749.
9. Id. at 393, 485 A.2d at 747. Although the court noted that Pennsylvania
law recognizes a landlord's duty to protect tenants from harm resulting from
physical defects on the premises of which the landlord knew or should have
known, the court emphasized that injuries resulting from physical defects are
caused by the landlord's own negligence while injuries resulting from criminal
activity are caused by an independent third party. Id. at 390, 485 A.2d at 745.
The court also recognized that there may be an analogy between the landlord-
tenant relationship and the relationship of property owner-business invitee, but
distinguished the two relationships. Id. at 390-91, 485 A.2d at 745. For a dis-
cussion of the court's distinction and reasoning, see infra notes 127-34 and ac-
companying text.
10. 506 Pa. at 394, 485 A.2d at 747. The court acknowledged the general
rule that absent a pre-existing duty a person is not under a duty to protect an-
other from criminal assault by a third party, but the court relied on an exception
to that principle which imposes liability where a person assumes a duty of pro-
tection and performs negligently. Id. at 392, 485 A.2d at 746 (citing Pascarella
v. Kelley, 378 Pa. 18, 105 A.2d 70 (1954); Rehder v. Miller, 35 Pa. Super. 344
(1908); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965)). The court emphasized
that if a landlord agrees to provide tenants with a program of security, the land-
lord incurs a duty to maintain that program in a reasonable manner under the
circumstances. Id. at 393-94, 485 A.2d at 747.
11. See 506 Pa. at 390-95, 485 A.2d at 746-48. This modern trend appears
in the Restatement (Second) of Property:
For the purpose of this section, the unreasonable risk of harm from
criminal intrusion constitutes a dangerous condition, so that where the
landlord could by the exercise of reasonable care have discovered the
unreasonable risk of criminal intrusion and could have made the condi-
tion safe from such unreasonable risk of criminal intrusion, he is sub-
ject to liability for physical harm caused by criminal intrusion if he has
not taken the necessary precautions. As regards parts of the property
3
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that, unless the landlord makes an agreement to provide security, he has
no obligation to protect his tenants against criminals. 12
The Feld opinion contains ambiguities which may make the opinion
difficult for courts to apply in the future.' 3 Before discussing these am-
biguities, however, this note will examine the modern trend of imposing
a duty of protection upon landlords, review the legal theories support-
ing this trend, and examine the analytical problems underlying these
theories.' 4 The note will then discuss the Feld court's reaction to the
trend of imposing a duty of protection on landlords and the resulting
limited nature of this duty in Pennsylvania. 15 In addition, this note will
suggest that the Feld court overreacted in its attempt to limit a landlord's
duty. 16 Finally, the note will suggest a future course of action for courts
retained in the landlord's control, common entranceways, fire escapes,
halls and other approaches to the leased property are included. In ad-
dition, other parts of the property, such as door locks on the entrance
to the tenant's apartment or office, may be effectively retained in the
landlord's control in the sense that the landlord is the only one with the
authority to make necessary changes in order to avoid unreasonable
risk of harm.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY, Landlord and Tenant, § 17.3 comment 1,
at 189 (1977). For a further discussion of this trend, see infra notes 54-113 and
accompanying text. See also Haines, Landlords or Tenants: Who Bears the Costs of
Crime?, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 299, 300 (1981) (recent cases have held that landlord
has duty to protect his tenants from criminal intrusion).
12. 506 Pa. 383, 390, 485 A.2d 742, 745. This traditional view has been
discussed by several other courts. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment
Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (general rule that private person does
not have duty to protect another from criminal attack by third person has been
applied to landlord-tenant relationship); Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509,
511-12 (D.C. 1969) ("As a general rule, a landlord has no duty to protect a
tenant, or a tenant's property, from criminal acts of third persons."); King v.
Ilikai Properties, Inc., 632 P.2d 657, 661-62 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1982) (without
special relationship or special circumstances landlord has no duty to protect his
tenants from criminal assault by third parties); Stribling v. Chicago Hous. Auth.,
34 Ill. App. 3d 551, 556, 340 N.E.2d 47, 50 (1975) (landlord had no duty to
protect tenant against first burglary, but given bizarre facts of case he had such
duty with regard to second burglary); Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68
N.J. 368, 374, 346 A.2d 76, 79 (1975) (relationship between landlord and ten-
ant, without more, does not impose upon landlords duty to protect tenants from
crimes of third persons). See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 331, 335 (1972) (gen-
eral discussion of landlord's duty to provide security).
13. For a discussion of the ambiguities in the Feld court's decision, see infra
notes 135-81 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the legal theories supporting the trend of imposing
liability upon landlords and the analytical problems underlying these theories,
see infra notes 54-113 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Feld court's decision, see infra notes 114-34 and
accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of how the Feld court possibly overreacted in its at-
tempt to limit a landlord's duty of protection, see infra notes 135-81 and accom-
panying text.
4
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and legislatures addressing this issue. 17
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Traditional Landlord Tort Liability
Traditionally, the rule of law with regard to leases was caveat
emptor.18 Under that rule, the tenant was deemed to be the owner of
the leased premises for a term, 19 and he was responsible for injuries
resulting from the condition of the premises.20 The landlord, therefore,
was not liable to the tenant or to others for any defective condition ex-
isting at the time of the lease. 2 ' As the needs and views of society have
changed, however, exceptions to this traditional view have emerged. 22
17. For this suggested future course of action, see infra notes 182-90 and
accompanying text.
18. See Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 279, 405 A.2d 897, 900 (1979). The
rule of caveat emptor as applied to landlord-tenant relationships developed in
England in the sixteenth century and was adopted in Pennsylvania in the nine-
teenth century. Id. Under this doctrine, the landlord had no obligations to the
tenant other than those made expressly, and the tenant's obligation to pay rent
was independent of the landlord's covenants. Id. at 280, 405 A.2d at 901 (quot-
ing Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 80, 384 A.2d 1234, 1237-38 (1978)).
Underlying this doctrine was the historical assumption that the landlord and ten-
ant have equal bargaining power, an assumption that developed, in part, from
the agrarian tenant's ability to fully inspect the dwelling and to make simple
repairs. Id. at 280, 405 A.2d at 900 (quoting Pugh v. Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76,
80, 384 A.2d 1234, 1237-38 (1978)).
19. See id. at 280, 405 A.2d at 901. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 63, at 434 (5th ed. 1984); Recent Development, Expanding the
Scope of the Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from
Foreseeable Criminal Activity, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1493, 1495-96 (1980) (lessee, as
purchaser of real property, took premises "as is" and doctrines of caveat emptor
applied).
20. Browder, The Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH.
L. REV. 99, 101 (1982) ("Since the tenant was [deemed] an 'owner'.., he alone
was responsible for the condition of the leased premises.").
21. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, § 63, at 434. See also Pugh v.
Holmes, 253 Pa. Super. 76, 82 n.2, 384 A.2d 1234, 1237 n.2 (1978) (analyzing
historical context of caveat emptor), aff'd, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979). See
generally 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 225(2) (P. Rohan rev. ed.
1985) ("Under normal circumstances the lessee takes the full risk as to the fit-
ness of the premises for the uses to which he intends to apply them."); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, LANDLORD & TENANT § 5.1 reporter's note 2
(1977) (common law adhered to principle that absent agreement to contrary
landlord did not warrant condition of leased premises).
22. See Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 279-80, 405 A.2d 897, 900-01 (1979)
(recognizing that, in changed times, caveat emptor has outlived its usefulness);
Browder, supra note 20, at 102-09 (acknowledging that exceptions to caveat
emptor "some appearing long ago, have eroded the old rule and are now gener-
ally accepted as part of the traditional law"). These exceptions to the traditional
nonliability of landlords are stated in the Second Restatement of Torts:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render serv-
ices to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protec-
tion of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other
5
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These exceptions include the duty of a landlord to use reasonable care
to keep common areas 23 safe, 24 to disclose latent defects, 2 5 to inspect
and repair those portions of the leased premises used by the public, 26
and to use reasonable care in endeavoring to repair the portions of the
for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care
to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court observed in Feld that § 323 has been the law in Pennsylvania for some
time. 506 Pa. at 392-93, 485 A.2d at 746-47 (citing Cradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa.
534, 541, 421 A.2d 674, 677 (1980); DeJesus v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 423 Pa.
198, 201, 233 A.2d 849, 850 (1966)). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 19, § 63, at 435 (discussing exceptions to landlord's nonliability
under common law). For a further discussion of the exceptions to the tradi-
tional view, see infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
23. Common areas are those areas of a multiple unit dwelling over which
the landlord retains control and which do not pass to the tenant, including those
areas that may be used by all the tenants of an apartment building. See Baldwin
v. McEldowney, 324 Pa. 399, 403, 188 A. 154, 155 (1936).
24. Lopez v. Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359, 365, 137 A.2d 771, 775 (1958) (land-
lord is responsible for maintaining common areas of apartment building in rea-
sonably safe condition and liable for injuries caused by defects discoverable
upon reasonable inspection). See also Leary v. Lawrence Sales Corp., 442 Pa.
389, 275 A.2d 32 (1971) (landlord responsible for safety in common passage-
ways and aisles used by business invitees of tenants).
25. Kolojeski v. John Deisher, Inc., 429 Pa. 191, 195, 239 A.2d 329, 331(1968) (dictum) (landlord liable if injury results from dangerous condition of
which landlord knew and lessee had no knowledge). See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 358 (1965). Section 358 provides:
(1) A lessor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his lessee
any condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasona-
ble risk of physical harm to persons on the land, is subject to liability to
the lessee and others upon the land with the consent of the lessee or his
sublessee for physical harm caused by the condition after the lessee has
taken possession, if
(a) the lessee does not know or have reason to know of the condi-
tion or the risk involved, and
(b) the lessor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and
realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to expect
that the lessee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.
(2) If the lessee actively conceals the condition, the liability stated
in Subsection (1) continues until the lessee [or] discovers it and has
reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against it. Other-
wise the liability continues only until the vendee [lessee] has had rea-
sonable opportunity to discover the condition and to take such
precautions.
Id.
26. Miller v. Atlantic Refining Co., 393 Pa. 466, 143 A.2d 380 (1958) (land-
lord liable to third party injured on leased premises since landlord owes duty to
public to protect it from dangerous conditions); Folkman v. Lauer, 244 Pa. 605,
91 A. 218 (1914) (owner of rented baseball park liable for injuries to spectators
when grandstand collapsed).
632
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss2/5
1986] NOTE 633
premises retained by the tenant. 27
Recently, many courts and legislatures have adopted the view that a
warranty of habitability28 is implied in every residential lease. 29 In Pugh
27. Green v. Independent Oil Co., 414 Pa. 477, 484-85, 201 A.2d 207, 211
(1964).
28. In Pennsylvania the implied warranty of habitability requires, at a mini-
mum, that the leased premises be safe and sanitary; however, there is no obliga-
tion on the landlord to supply a perfect or aesthetically pleasing dwelling. Pugh
v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 289, 405 A.2d 897, 905 (1979). The Pugh court stated
that the warranty is breached if a defect exists that prevents the use of the dwell-
ing for its intended purposes. Id. In order to establish a breach, the tenant must
prove he gave notice of the defect to the landlord, that the landlord had a rea-
sonable time to repair the defect, and that the landlord failed to do so. Id. at
290, 405 A.2d at 906 (1979).
The leading case analyzing the purpose of the warranty of habitability is
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970). TheJavins court explained that, today, unlike the feudal era, the
land is no longer the most important part of a leasehold, and the modern urban
tenant is less capable of making repairs than his predecessor. 428 F.2d at 1074-
79. The court, therefore, required the landlord inJavins to warrant the habita-
bility of the urban multi-unit residential premises. Id. at 1074. TheJavins court
decided that satisfaction of the warranty was dependent upon compliance with
applicable housing codes. Id. at 1080. Moreover, underJavins, the tenant's obli-
gation to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord providing habitable premises,
and the duties imposed by the warranty cannot be waived through contract. Id.
at 1081-82. In addition, the warranty continues to operate throughout the
length of the lease. Id. at 1081.
The trend that led to the landmark decision inJavins started with Pines v.
Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). In Pines, the court stated:
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases
would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative pol-
icy concerning housing standards. The need and social desirability of
adequate housing for people in this era of rapid population increases is
too important to be rebuffed by the obnoxious legal cliche, caveat
emptor.
Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
29. See, e.g., Alaska-ALAsKA STAT. §§ 34.03.100, .160, .180 (1985); Ari-
zona-ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-1324, 1361 (1974 & Supp. 1985); Califor-
nia-CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1941, 1942 (West 1985); Green v. Superior Court, 10
Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Connecticut-CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47a-7, -12, -13 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985); Todd v. May, 6
Conn. Cir. Ct. 731, 316 A.2d 793 (1973); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25,
§ 5303 (1974); District of Columbia-Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Florida-FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 83.51, .56 (West Supp. 1985); Georgia-GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-7-13, 44-
7-14 (1982); Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, 210 N.E.2d 350 (1974); Stack
v. Harris, 111 Ga. 149, 36 S.E. 615 (1906); Givens v. Gray, 126 Ga. App. 309,
190 S.E.2d 609 (1972); Hawaii-HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-42 (1976 & Supp.
1984); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Idaho-IDAHO
CODE § 6-320; Illinois-Jack Spring Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208
(1972); Indiana-Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1976); Iowa-Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Kansas-Steele
v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Kentucky-Ky. REV. STAT.
§§ 383.595, .596 (Supp. 1985); Maine-ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021(1980 & Supp. 1985); Maryland-MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211 (1981)
(superseded in their respective jurisdictions by Baltimore City Public Local Laws
7
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v. Holmes,30 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the warranty of
habitability in response to the modern tenant's lack of bargaining
power, 3 ' the acute housing shortage,3 2 and the reality that a modern
§§ 9-9, -10, 14.1 (effectiveJuly 1, 1971); Montgomery County Code, Fair Land-
lord-Tenant Relations, ch. 93A (effective Nov. 21, 1972)); Massachusetts-MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (West Supp. 1985); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hem-
ingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Michigan-MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 554.139 (West Supp. 1985); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196
N.W.2d 850 (1972); Minnesota-MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1986);
Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973); Missouri-King v.
Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Nebraska-NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 76-1419, -1425, -1427 (1981); Nevada-NEv. REV. STAT. § 118A.290 (1986)
(but note that Nevada statute does not protect tenants whose landlord owns
fewer than seven units); New Hampshire-Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276
A.2d 248 (1971); New Jersey-Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d 526
(1970); New Mexico-N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-20 (1982); New York-N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1986); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65
Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Civ. Ct. 1971); North Carolina-N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 42-42 (1984); North Dakota-N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-16-13.1, -13.5, -13.6
(1977); Ohio-OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.04, .07 (Page 1981); Glyco v.
Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun. Ct. 1972);
Oklahoma-OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 118 (Supp. 1985); Oregon-OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 91.770, .800, .815 (1985); Pennsylvania-Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405
A.2d 897 (1979); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-16 (1984); Tennes-
see-TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-2823, -2824, -2841 (1974); Texas-Kamarath v.
Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 685 (Tex. 1978); Vermont-VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4859
(1973) (remedy limited to affirmative defenses only); Virginia-VA. CODE §§ 55-
248.13, .25 (1981 & Supp. 1985); Washington-WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18-
060 (Supp. 1974); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); West
Virginia-W. VA. CODE § 37-6-30 (1982) (sets out landlord obligations but does
not provide remedy for breach); Wisconsin-Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590,
111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). But see Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 191 Colo. 344, 348, 558
P.2d 563, 567 (1976) (adoption of the warranty of habitability is job for legisla-
ture); Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 182-83, 174 N.W.2d 528, 533 (1970)
(tenant does not have right to withhold rent for housing code violations).
30. 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979). In Pugh, the landlord had brought
an action against the tenant to regain possession of the premises and to collect
unpaid rent. Id. at 278, 405 A.2d at 900. In defense, the tenant asserted that the
landlord had breached the implied warranty of habitability, and the tenant
claimed as a set-off the amount spent to repair a broken lock. Id. at 279, 405
A.2d at 900. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a lease is in essence a
contract and that a warranty of habitability is implied in every residential lease.
Id. at 284, 405 A.2d at 903. The court also held that the tenant's rent obliga-
tions under the lease and the landlord's obligation to provide a habitable prem-
ises are mutually dependent. Id.
31. Id. at 282, 405 A.2d at 902. The idea that a tenant had inferior bargain-
ing power in relation to his landlord was first stated in Edwards v. Habib, 397
F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). In Edwards, the
court relied on the tenant's lack of bargaining power to conclude that a landlord
could not evict a tenant for utilizing the remedy of constructive eviction. Id. In
Javins v. First Nat ' Realty Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia also discussed the tenants' lack of bargaining power. 428 F.2d
at 1079 (D.C. Cir.) (citing Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969); 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
221[l], at 179 (1967)), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). TheJavins court rea-
soned that tenants have very little leverage to enforce demands for better hous-
8
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lease should be viewed as a contract in which the tenant expects to ex-
change periodic payments for "a bundle of goods and services." '33 In
light of these developments, and especially with the advent of the war-
ranty of habitability, a few courts have held that the common law tort
immunity of landlords is outdated and have instead imposed on the
landlord a duty of reasonable care under all of the circumstances. 3 4 Re-
cently, the California Supreme Court went even further and held a land-
lord liable on a theory of strict liability for latent structural defects in the
premises.
3 5
ing as a result of various impediments to competition in the rental housing
market and standardized form leases. 428 F.2d at 1079. The court stated that
these factors place the tenant in a take-it-or-leave-it situation. Id. For a further
discussion of the court's reasoning inJavins, see supra note 28.
32. 486 Pa. at 282-83, 405 A.2d at 902 (citing Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431
Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968)).
33. 486 Pa. at 282, 405 A.2d at 902 (quoting Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970)). This
language indicates that, because of the trend to interpret leases according to
contract law, the common law view of leases is no longer applicable to the mod-
ern urban landlord-tenant relationship. See 486 Pa. at 282, 405 A.2d at 902.
34. Brennan v. Cockrell Invs., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 800-0 1, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 122, 125 (1973) (requiring landlord to use reasonable care under all cir-
cumstances is sound social policy); Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328, 1330
(Fla. 1981) (landlord has continuing duty of reasonable care in maintaining and
repairing leased premises unless waived by tenant); Young v. Garwacki, 380
Mass. 162, 169, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (1980) (landlord has duty to act with
reasonable care under all circumstances); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397,
308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973) (a landlord must act as reasonable person under all
circumstances); Pagelsdorfv. Stafeco Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 2d 734, 741, 284 N.W.2d
55, 59 (1979) (social policy dictates adoption of rule requiring landlords to exer-
cise ordinary care in maintaining premises).
-By imposing a standard of reasonable care upon landlords, the courts have
applied the general principles of tort law to landlords, a dramatic reversal of the
common law rule of landlord nonliability in tort. See Sargent, 113 N.H. 388, 308
A.2d 528; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, § 63 at 446. In addition, the
California Court of Appeals recently held that a landlord's duty to maintain his
premises was nondelegable. Cordet v. Robert Christopher Co., 164 Cal. App.
3d 384, 392, 210 Cal. Rptr. 517, 521 (1985). Thus, according to the Cordet
court, a landlord cannot escape liability by retaining an independent contractor
to maintain the leased premises. Id.
35. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213
(1985). In Becker, a tenant fell against an untempered, frosted glass shower
door, severely breaking and lacerating his arm. Id. at 457, 698 P.2d at 117, 213
Cal. Rptr. at 214. The landlords were not aware of the fact that the doors were
made of untempered glass and, therefore, were not aware of any risk to tenants
until the injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 458, 698 P.2d at 117-18, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
214-15. The court observed that landlords "are an integral part of the enter-
prise of producing and marketing rental housing" and "have more than a ran-
dom or accidental role in the marketing enterprise." Id. at 467, 698 P.2d at 124,
213 Cal. Rptr. at 221. The court concluded that since landlords are an integral
part of the rental business "they should bear the cost of injuries resulting from
such defects rather than injured persons who are powerless to protect them-
selves." Id. (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 576, 337
P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962)). The court also held that under traditional
9
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B. Theories Utilized to Impose a Duty of Protection
Modern courts increasingly view leases as contracts in which the
tenant's rental obligation is dependent on the landlord's performance of
certain duties.3 6 Nevertheless, courts still rely, in part, on traditional
property law3 7 to avoid imposing liability on landlords for injuries to
tenants that result from criminal intrusion.3 8 The courts' reluctance to
impose a duty of protection on landlords also derives from the tort prin-
ciple that a person is rarely under a duty to protect another person from
the criminal conduct of a third party.3 9 This principle reflects the legal
negligence theory a landlord, when purchasing a rental premises, has a duty to
exercise due care in inspecting the premises for dangerous conditions in exist-
ence at the time of purchase. Id. at 469, 698 P.2d at 125, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
Moreover, the court indicated that the lack of knowledge of the dangerous con-
dition does not preclude liability. Id. For a recent discussion of California law
concerning landlords' and landowners' tort liability, see Comment, Cordet,
Preston and Becker: Recent California Decisions Impacting Landowner Tort Liability,
13 W. ST. U.L. REV. 279 (1985).
36. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C.
Cir.) ("trend toward treating leases as contracts is wise and well considered"),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Pugh, 486 Pa. at 284, 405 A.2d at 903 (a lease is
in the nature of a contract).
37. For a discussion of the treatment of leases under traditional property
law, see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Feld, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (landlord has no general duty
to provide protection for tenants); King v. Ilikai Properties Inc., 632 P.2d 657
(Hawaii Ct. App. 1982) (absent "special circumstances" landlord has no duty of
protection). See also Haines, supra note 11, at 305 (treatment of lease as convey-
ance was reason for judicial reluctance to impose duty of protection upon
landlords).
39. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 481 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (noting general rule that individuals are rarely under duty to protect
another from criminal attack). Under tort law there is no duty to protect another
from criminal assault unless a special relationship exists between the parties, and
courts have been reluctant to find a special relationship between landlord and
tenant. See, e.g., Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 99, 302 N.E.2d
207, 209 (1973). In addition, while some courts have imposed liability on land-
lords for tenants' injuries resulting from criminal assaults in common areas
which the landlords have a duty to keep safe, other courts have been unwilling to
accept this analysis, maintaining that a landlord's duty to keep common areas
safe extends only to keeping the common areas free of physical defects and not
to preventing criminal activity. See Feld, 506 Pa. at 392, 485 A.2d at 746 (1984);
Trice, 14 Ill. 3d at 99, 302 N.E.2d at 209.
The theory that an individual has no duty to protect another from criminal
attack is also stated in § 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 315
provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to pre-
vent him from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third per-
son which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's
conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which
gives to the other a right to protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
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distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, which weighs against
imposing on landlords a duty to protect tenants from criminal
intrusion.40
Section 314A of the Restatement explains the types of special relationships
that give rise to the duty of protection mentioned in § 315:
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reason-
able action
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm,
and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that
they are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for
by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a
similar duty to members of the public who enter in response to his
invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the
custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of
his normal opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the
other.
Id. § 314A. In addition, under § 323 of the Restatement a person may be held to a
duty of protection if he or she voluntarily assumes such a duty. Id. § 323. For
the text of § 323, see supra note 22.
40. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (citing Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291
(1962)). In explaining the development of the legal distinction between misfea-
sance and nonfeasance, one commentator has stated:
This distinction is founded on that attitude of extreme individualism so
typical of anglo-saxon legal thought.
In the case of active misfeasance the victim is positively worse off as
a result of the wrongful act. In cases of passive inaction plaintiff is in
reality no worse off at all. This situation is unchanged; he is merely
deprived of a protection which, had it been afforded him, would have
benefited him.
Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV.
217, 220 (1908).
According to one court, the reasons for applying the misfeasance-nonfea-
sance distinction to the landlord-tenant relationship are the following:
judicial reluctance to tamper with the traditional common law concept
of the landlord-tenant relationship; the notion that the act of a third
person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding
cause of the harm to another... ; the ... difficult problem of determin-
ing foreseeability of criminal acts; the vagueness of the standard which
the landlord must meet; the economic consequences of the imposition
of the duty [to provide security]; and conflict with the public policy allo-
cating the duty of protecting citizens from criminal acts to the govern-
ment rather than the private sector.
Kline, 439 F.2d at 481. The economic impact of imposing on landlords a duty of
providing criminal protection was first recognized by the New Jersey Supreme
Court. Goldberg, 38 N.J. at 591-92, 186 A.2d at 298-99. The Goldberg court
pointed out that the burden of imposing this duty would fall on those people
who could least afford it. Id. at 591, 186 A.2d at 298. The court stated, "the bill
will be paid, not by the owner, but by the tenants. And if, as we apprehend, the
incidence of crime is greatest in the areas in which the poor must live, they, and
they alone, will be singled out to pay for their own police protection." Id. For a
11
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1. The Kline Decision
Bringing the law into line with the modern landlord-tenant relation-
ship, the leading case to impose on landlords a duty to provide tenants
with security4 ' is Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.4 2 In
Kline, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 43
general discussion of the economic aspects of imposing this duty, see Note,
Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants From Criminal Acts of Third Parties: The View From
1500 Massachusetts Avenue, 59 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1194-1201 (1971). See also infra
note 156.
In applying the legal distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, the
courts have been reluctant to require landlords to act affirmatively to protect
tenants from criminal intrusion. See, e.g., Cross v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 74 Ill.
App. 3d 921, 393 N.E.2d 580 (1979), aff'd sub nom. Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm
Servs., 82 Ill. 2d 313, 412 N.E.2d 472 (1980). See also Haines, supra note 11, at
306 ("Absent active wrongdoing on the part of [the] landlord, courts have en-
countered difficulty in defining the circumstances that warrant imposing a duty
of protection on landlords . . .").
41. See Browder, supra note 20, at 145; Haines, supra note 11, at 299 (stating
that Kline opinion constituted significant departure from established rules).
Although Kline is often cited as the leading case in this area of law, the basis
for the Kline decision was developing for several years prior to the Kline court's
decision. See Comment, supra note 1, at 284 (noting two prior cases with hold-
ings similar to Kline).
42. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In Kline, the plaintiff was injured in a
common hallway of her apartment building. Id. at 478. The plaintiff had moved
into the apartment building in 1959 when the security measures included a 24-
hour doorman and at least one employee in the lobby who could observe the
elevators. Id. at 479. The plaintiff testified that she had moved into the building
because she was interested in security. Id. at 479 n. 1. At the time of the assault,
however, most of the security measures in effect at the start of her lease had
been discontinued. Id. at 479. The court held that a landlord of an urban,
multi-unit apartment complex had a duty to protect his tenants from criminal
attack. Id. at 483. The court stated that this duty was based on three theories:
(1) the theory that the landlord was in a better position than the tenant to pro-
vide the necessary level of protection; (2) the theory that where the tenant con-
tinues to pay the same level of rent, the landlord has a duty to continue to
provide the same level of security; and (3) the theory that the landlord-tenant
relationship was analogous to the innkeeper-guest relationship where the inn-
keeper has a duty to protect his guest from foreseeable criminal assault. Id. at
483-85.
In dissent, Judge McKinnon pointed out that at the time of the assault the
plaintiff's original lease had expired, rendering her a month-to-month tenant.
Id. at 492 (McKinnon, J., dissenting). The plaintiff knew, therefore, of the de-
cline in the apartment's security services, and, according to Judge McKinnon,
the degree of security that the landlord was required to provide and that the
tenant reasonably could expect should not have been measured by the standards
in effect at the beginning of the expired lease. Id.
43. The court system of the District of Columbia was restructured in 1971,
after the Kline decision. See District of Columbia Reform and Criminal Proce-
dure Act of 1970 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to -2504,
23-101 to -1705 (1981)). Under the act of February 1, 1971, the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals became the highest court of review for the District, and
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit could no
longer review the decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Id.
§ 11-102. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals was no longer bound by
638 [Vol. 31: p. 627
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ruled that a landlord has a duty "to take . . .steps which are within his
power to minimize the predictable risk [of crime] to his tenants."'4 4 The
Kline court offered three reasons for its landmark holding. First, the
court stated that landlords, not tenants, are in a position to implement
security measures. 45 Second, relying in part on the warranty of habita-
bility, the court stated that there was implied in every lease an obligation
on the landlord to provide protective measures within his reasonable
capacity. 4 6 Third, the court compared the modern landlord-tenant rela-
tionship to the common law relationship between an innkeeper and a
guest, in which the innkeeper has a duty to protect his guests from crimi-
nal attacks by third persons.
4 7
Despite the apparent acceptance of Kline by courts and scholars, 4
8
some commentators have criticized the decision for its unnecessary and
unsatisfactory mixture of tort and contract analysis, 4 9 and for its failure
decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit rendered after the effective date of
the bill. Id. Decisions announced prior to that date, such as Kline, remain the
law of the District of Columbia. Id. However, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals has decided that it may refuse to follow such a decision, but only after a
decision by the court sitting en banc. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312
(D.C. 1971). The Kline decision remains unimpaired by the reorganization. See
Spahr v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173 (D.C. 1977). For a discussion of the District of
Columbia Court Reform Act, see Williams, District of Columbia Reorganization,
1970, 59 GEO. L.J. 477, 493-94 (1971).
44. 439 F.2d at 481. In reaching its decision, the Kline court noted that it is
no longer appropriate to view leases as a conveyance of land for a term. Id. at
481. The court said thatJavins had "clear[ed] away some of the legal under-
brush from medieval common law obscuring the modern landlord-tenant rela-
tionship." Id. at 482.
45. Id. at 483-84. The court stated that "[n]ot only as between landlord
and tenant is the landlord best equipped to guard against the predictable risk of
intruders, but even as between the landlord and the police power of government
is the landlord in the best position to take the necessary protective measures."
Id. at 484.
46. Id. at 485. The court ruled that based on the facts of Kline, the protec-
tive measures that were within the landlord's reasonable capacity were those
measures which were in existence at the commencement of the lease. Id. For a
brief discussion of the warranty of habitability, see supra notes 28-33 and accom-
panying text. For a further discussion of how the warranty of habitability has
been applied to impose a duty of protection upon landlords, see infra notes 73-
88 and accompanying text.
47. 439 F.2d at 482, 485. See also Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 628 (1960) (discuss-
ing liability of innkeeper or restauranteur). For a further discussion of the inn-
keeper-guest relationship, see infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
48. See Browder, supra note 20, at 145 (Kline is the leading case on this, and
subsequent courts have relied on a variation of the Kline court's contract and tort
theories to impress a duty of protection upon landlords); Haines, supra note 11,
at 300 (Kline decision has generally received favorable criticism from legal schol-
ars, although it took a few years before other courts were persuaded by its
analysis).
49. See Note, Landlord Has Duty to Take Reasonable Precautions to Protect His
Tenants Against Criminal Acts of Third Parties, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 943, 954 (1970)
(suggesting that Kline court could have relied solely on tort theory and that its
"analysis of the landlord's contractual obligation was unsatisfactory").
13
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to render a precise theory of landlord liability. 50 It also has been sug-
gested that the Kline decision may have limited precedential value be-
cause of its vagueness. 5 1 The accuracy of this criticism is evidenced by
the fact that many courts have chosen to limit Kline strictly to its facts.
5 2
Moreover, other courts have virtually ignored the Kline court's analysis
and, instead, have relied on alternative theories in resolving the ques-
tion of a landlord's duty to provide protection for his tenants.
53
2. Special Relationship Theory
Since the Kline decision, some courts have relied on the special rela-
tionship between a landlord and tenant to impose on landlords an af-
firmative duty to provide some degree of security for tenants. 54 The
50. See Comment, supra note 1, at 286 ("The alternative lines of reasoning
used by the Kline court in arriving at its holding leave a large element of ambigu-
ity as to the precise scope and applicability that may be expected to be given to
the case as precedent."); Note, Emerging Landlord Liability: A Judicial Reevaluation
of Tenant Remedies, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 387, 396 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Emerging Landlord Liability] (Kline court failed to specify basis for its holding
as either tort or contract); Note, supra note 19, at 1512-13 ("If the Kline duty to
protect was actually a duty only to maintain existing security measures, then Kline
did not really impose any new obligations on a landlord; instead, it merely held
him liable under traditional notions of misfeasance.") (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted).
51. See Note, Emerging Landlord Liability, supra note 50, at 395 (failure to rely
on clean legal analysis places future application of Kline in question because if its
underlying theory is in the contract, the services that the landlord afforded at the
time of the signing of the lease are implied in the terms of that lease, but if the
theory is tort-based, it might be inferred that every landlord has a duty to pro-
vide protection against third parties). See also Comment, The Landlord's Duty in
New York to Protect His Tenant Against Criminal Intrusions, 45 ALB. L. REV. 988, 1001
(1981) ("Although the Kline case developed several new approaches to the ques-
tion of whether a landlord owes a duty of security to his tenant, its precedential
value remains uncertain.").
52. See, e.g., King v. Ilikai Properties, Inc., 632 P.2d 657, 661 (Hawaii Ct.
App. 1982); Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 100, 302 N.E.2d
207, 209 (1973); Gulf Reston Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 159, 207 S.E.2d 841,
845 (1974). See also Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, Inc., 497 F. Supp.
320, 322 (D. Kan. 1980) (cases imposing duty of protection upon landlords rely
on prevailing high rate of crime in area); Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173, 177
(D.C. 1977) ("[A]ppellants themselves recognize that the facts here are 'in sharp
contrast' to those in Kline.").
53. See, e.g., Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173 (D.C. 1977). The court in Spar
stated that the facts of that case were "in sharp contrast" to those of Kline and
held that the landlord had a duty to use reasonable care in maintaining common
areas, which included a duty to provide security. Id. at 177. See also Scott v.
Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976) (finding no special relationship be-
tween landlord and tenant but imposing on landlord a duty to take reasonable
measures against crime existing on landlord's premises).
54. Kwaitowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1981) (relying on special relationship theory and landlord's knowl-
edge of risk of rape); O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., Intercoast Manage-
ment, 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977) (relying on special
relationship theory and landlord's knowledge of risk of rape); Totten v. More
640
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Kline court led the way in developing this theory, 55 but later decisions by
other courts, such as the Michigan Supreme Court inJohnston v. Harris 56
and Samson v. Saginaw Professional Building,57 arguably have gone even
further by utilizing a form of the special relationship theory to impose a
duty of protection upon landlords.
58
Oakland Residential Hous., Inc., 63 Cal. App. 3d 538, 134 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1976)
(recognizing, in dicta, special relationship between landlord and tenant which
gives rise to duty of protection); Feld v. Merriam, 314 Pa. Super. 414, 426-27,
461 A.2d 225, 231-32 (1983) (relying on both warranty of habitability and Penn-
sylvania's recognition of duty of protection in other special relationships), rev'd,
506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984).
55. See 439 F.2d at 841-43. For a discussion of the Kline decision, see supra
notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
56. 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972). InJohnston, a tenant brought
an action against his landlord for injuries he sustained when he was attacked in
the hall of his apartment building as he approached his apartment's front door.
Id. at 572, 198 N.W.2d at 409. The plaintiff asserted that the hall was unlocked
and dimly lit. Id. The plaintiff argued that in a high crime district it was reason-
ably foreseeable that inadequate lighting and an unlocked door would create a
risk of criminal assault. Id. at 573, 198 N.W.2d at 410. In holding that the
tenant could maintain his action against the landlord, the court reasoned that
after the landlord had been informed of similar assaults in the neighborhood, he
had a duty to provide adequate lighting and locks in common areas. Id. at 575,
198 N.W.2d at 411.
57. 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975). In Samson, an employee of a
tenant company in the Saginaw Professional Building was attacked by a patient
of a mental health clinic that was also a tenant of the building. Id. at 398-99, 224
N.W.2d at 845. The court affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff and stated:
"[T]he existence of this relationship between the defendant and its tenants and
invitees placed a duty upon the landlord to protect them from unreasonable risk
of physical harm." Id. at 407, 224 N.W.2d at 849 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 314A(3) (1965)).
58. It is noted that neither the Johnston nor Samson courts explicitly stated
that the special relationship theory was the basis for its holding. An examination
of the courts' reasoning, however, suggests that the special relationship theory
underlies both decisions.
The Johnston court relied heavily upon § 302B of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. See Johnston, 387 Mich. at 573-76, 198 N.W.2d at 410-11. Section 302B
states that "[a]n act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through
the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm even
though such conduct is criminal." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B
(1965). Comment a to § 302B, however, explains that comment a of § 302 is
also applicable to § 302B. Id. § 302B comment a. Section 302 comment a states
that the duties of an individual who omits to act are confined to situations where
a special relationship exists between the parties, and specifically refers to § 314 of
the Restatement which explains what type of special relationships are or should be
recognized. Id. § 302 comment a (emphasis added). Thus, as the Restatement
indicates, when employing § 302B to analyze the duties of an individual who
omits to act, as the Johnston court did, that section must be read in conjunction
with comment a to § 302 and § 314. As a result of this analysis, it is clear that an
individual cannot be held liable under a § 302B analysis for omitting to act for
the benefit of another person unless a special relationship exists. See id. § 302
comment a.
In Samson, the Michigan court first noted that the case required the court to
1986] NOTE
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Most courts, however, have been hesitant to adopt the view that the
landlord-tenant relationship is a special one that imposes on the land-
lord an affirmative duty to protect tenants from criminal intrusion. 5 1
This reluctance may be attributed to the fact that the landlord-tenant
relationship is not one of the special relationships in which the law tradi-
tionally has imposed a duty of protection. 60 Policy considerations, how-
ever, support the conclusion that the landlord-tenant relationship is a
special one, 6 1 and some courts, such as the Kline court,6 2 have suggested
"revisit"Johnston. Samson, 393 Mich. at 402, 224 N.W.2d at 847. As inJohnston,
the court in Samson relied on § 302B of the Restatement. Id. at 404, 224 N.W.2d at
848. The Samson court then stated that in order to require a person to protect
another, the parties must share a relationship that society views as "sufficiently
strong." Id. at 406, 224 N.W.2d at 849 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 314-324A (1965)). The court then concluded that "this relationship between
the defendant and its tenants and invitees placed a duty [of protection] upon the
landlord." Id. at 407, 224 N.W.2d at 849 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314A(3)).
While the special relationship theory seems implicit in the Johnston and Sam-
son opinions, both courts also seem to have relied on the common area theory.
In Johnston, the assault occurred in a common area, and the court failed to spec-
ify the precise theory upon which it was relying. Johnston, 387 Mich. at 573-76,
198 N.W.2d at 410-11. See Browder, supra note 20, at 148 (Johnston decision
"leaves unclear whether the court would have extended the landlord 's duty be-
yond the familiar obligation to keep common areas in proper condition"). In
Samson, the court likewise confused its opinion by stating that the landlord has
responsibility to keep common areas "in good repair and reasonably safe for the
use of tenants ..." Samson, 393 Mich. at 407, 224 N.W.2d at 849.
59. See, e.g., Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 78 Ill. 2d 204, 208, 399 N.E.2d
596, 598 (1979) ("this case does not fall into the 'special relationship' excep-
tion"); Cross v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 74 Ill. App. 3d 921, 925, 393 N.E.2d 580,
584 (1979) ("A landlord-tenant relationship is not one which [is a special rela-
tionship] . . .in this jurisdiction"), aff'd, Cross v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 82
Ill. 2d 313, 412 N.E.2d 472 (1980); Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 167, 359 A.2d
548, 553 (1976) ("we decline to impose a special duty on a landlord to protect
his tenants from criminal activity"); Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155,
158, 207 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1974) ("[w]e have found no relevant case imposing a
duty on a landlord to protect a tenant from isolated criminal acts of third per-
sons merely because of the relationship of landlord and tenant"). See also
Haines, supra note 11, at 327 (few jurisdictions have imposed duty of protection
upon landlords based on special relationship theory).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965). Traditionally, the
special relationships in which a duty of protection has been imposed include:
innkeeper-guests, common carrier-passenger, business invitor-invitee, land-
owner-invitees, and employer-employee. Id. Comment b to § 314A provides
that this list is not exclusive and states that the "law appears ... to be working
slowly toward a recognition of the duty to ... protect in any relation of depen-
dence or of mutual dependence." Id. § 314A comment b. The Kline court and
others, in holding that the landlord-tenant relationship is a special one, have so
held because of the landlord's exclusive control over much of the premises and
the tenant's dependence on the landlord for repairs and security. See Kline, 439
F.2d at 482-83.
61. The fact that considerations of public policy may be utilized in ex-
panding the traditionally accepted special relationships has been recognized by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
The duties stated in this Section arise out of special relations between
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that a special relationship exists because the general rule exonerating a
third party from any duty to protect another from criminal attacks has
no applicability to the modern landlord-tenant relationship in urban
multi-dwelling apartment buildings where the tenant has little control
over the premises and is dependent upon the landlord for repairs and
security. 6 3 In addition, some courts have supported their adoption of
the special relationship theory by developing the analogy between the
landlord-tenant relationship and the traditional special relationships in
which the law has imposed a duty of protection, such as the innkeeper-
guest relationship. 6 4 Historically, an innkeeper owes his guests a high
standard of care approaching that of an insurer. 6 5 Because such a stan-
dard, if applied to landlords, could make them insurers of tenants' safety
and vulnerable to unlimited liability, some courts and commentators
have rejected the analogy between the innkeeper-guest and landlord-
tenant relationships. 6 6
the parties, which create a special responsibility, and take the case out
of the general rule. The relations listed are not intended to be exclusive, and are
not necessarily the only ones in which a duty of affirmative action for the aid or
protection of another may be found .... The law appears ... to be working slowly
toward a recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relation of dependence or of
mutual dependence.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A comment b (1965) (emphasis added).
62. For a discussion of the Kline decision, see supra notes 41-53 and accom-
panying text.
63. See Kline, 439 F.2d at 481.
64. Id. at 482-83. The Kline court reasoned that the traditional special rela-
tionships better reflect the modern landlord-tenant relationship where the ten-
ant is dependent on the landlord for services relating to the use of the premises.
Id. See also Feld v. Merriam, 314 Pa. Super. 414, 427, 461 A.2d 225, 231-32
(1983), rev'd, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984). Butcf Trentacost v. Brussel, 82
N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980). In Trentacost, the court relied on the warranty of
habitability to impose a duty of protection on the landlord without making an
analogy to any of the traditional special relationships. Id. at 225-29, 412 A.2d at
441-43. The court reasoned that an apartment was not habitable unless it was
secure from criminal intrusions. Id.
65. See Buck v. Hankin, 217 Pa. Super. 262, 269 A.2d 344 (1970). Under
common law in Pennsylvania, the fact that no negligence exists on the part of the
innkeeper with respect to his guest's property loss has not precluded liability.
Id. at 266, 269 A.2d at 346; Walsh v. Potterfield, 87 Pa. 376, 378 (1878) (inn-
keeper is bound to pay for goods stolen from guest unless stolen by servant or
companion of guest). See also Shubart v. Hotel Astor, 168 Misc. 431, 435, 5
N.Y.S.2d 203, 207 (Sup. Ct.) ("[a] person] entering a hotel 'is entitled to expect
that far greater preparations to secure his safety will be made than one entering
a private building' " (citing Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay Curr Co., 232 A.D. 53
(1931)), aff'd, 255 A.D. 1012, 8 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1938), aff'd, 281 N.Y. 597, 22
N.E.2d 167 (1939); Annot., 28 A.L.R. 4th 120, 122 (1984) (innkeepers are held
to strictest standard of care or diligence or to standard of care of insurer).
Some jurisdictions have enacted a statutory limitation on innkeepers' liabil-
ity. See, e.g., 37 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 61 (Purdon 1954) (innkeeper not liable
for guests' property loss provided vault or safe is available for guests' valuables,
windows and doors are equipped with suitable locks, and copy of statute is dis-
played in 10 conspicuous places in hotel).
66. See, e.g., Kline, 439 F.2d at 487 (1970); Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J.
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Courts that have adopted this analogy, however, have avoided mak-
ing landlords insurers of their tenants' safety by imposing a standard of
care based upon foreseeability and reasonableness under the circum-
stances, thus taking into consideration the neighborhood and the prac-
tices of landlords of similar buildings."7 By basing the standard of care
on such considerations, these courts have imposed a standard that is
comparable to other areas of tort law. 68 Such a standard of care was
applied in Ten Associates v. McCutchen.6 9 In Ten Associates, the court up-
held a jury verdict that the landlord had been negligent in failing to
maintain adequate security devices and in failing to warn the tenant of
known risks. 70 Explaining its holding, the court pointed to developing
law in Florida to the effect that "the landlord's duty of reasonable care
may include the duty to protect a tenant from ... reasonably foreseeable
criminal conduct." 7'
214, 221, 412 A.2d 436, 445 (1980); Feld v. Merriam, 314 Pa. Super. 414, 427,
461 A.2d 225, 231 (1983), rev'd, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 745 (1984). Courts are
reluctant to make landlords insurers of their tenants' safety because crime can
occur "anywhere, any time, and has been a risk of life for a long time." Feld, 506
Pa. at 391, 485 A.2d at 746. Moreover, "[n]o one really knows why people com-
mit crime, hence no one really knows what is 'adequate' deterrence in any given
situation." 7735 Hollywood Boulevard Venture v. Superior Court, 116 Cal.
App. 3d 901, 905, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530 (1981). Thus, it is reasoned that
making a landlord an insurer of his tenants' safety would impose a "duty which
is impossible of performance." Smith v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 36 Ill. App. 3d
967, 971, 344 N.E.2d 536, 540 (1976). See also Comment, Landlord Held Negligent
for Criminal Assault by Third Party Intruder on Tenant, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1102
(1971) (pointing out danger of wholehearted adoption of analogy between inn-
keeper and landlord because courts hold innkeeper to high degree of care to
secure guests' safety).
67. Kline, 439 F.2d at 485-86; Feld v. Merriam, 314 Pa. Super. 414,427,461
A.2d 225, 232, rev'd, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1983).
68. See Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 605, 186 A.2d
291, 305 (1962) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (duty to take reasonable care under the
circumstances is "no more vague than is the test of reasonableness throughout
our law generally").
69. 398 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 411 So. 2d 389 (Fla.
1981). In Ten Associates, a tenant who had been raped in her apartment brought
an action against her landlord for failure to provide adequate security and for
failing to warn of the risk of intrusion when the landlord knew such a risk ex-
isted. 398 So. 2d at 861. The court affirmed ajury verdict that the negligence of
the landlord was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Id.
70. Ten Associates, 398 So. 2d at 861-63.
71. Id. (citing Whelan v. Dacoma Enters., Inc., 394 So. 2d 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Holley v.
Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980))
(footnote omitted). The Ten Associates court noted, however, that a landlord is
not an insurer of his tenant's safety and that in the past a landlord had no duty to
protect his tenants against criminal intrusion. Ten Associates, 398 So. 2d at 861.
While the Ten Associates court did not suggest that the landlord-tenant relation-
ship was a special one, at least one commentator has suggested that Ten Associates
stands for such a proposition. See Comment, Landlord Liability-Obligation to
Maintain Adequate Security-A Comparative Study, 59 TUL. L. REV. 701, 713-14
(1985).
[Vol. 3 1: p. 62 7644
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Because most courts do not view the landlord-tenant relationship as
a special one,72 however, only a few courts have faced the problem of
how to limit a landlord's liability under the special relationship theory.
3. Warranty of Habitability Theory
Some courts, although refraining from characterizing the landlord-
tenant relationship as a special one, have utilized the warranty of habita-
bility to impose a duty of protection on landlords. These courts have
done so either by interpreting the warranty of habitability to require a
reasonable or minimum level of security,73 or by interpreting the war-
ranty to mean that every lease implies a promise by the landlord to
maintain the level of security that was in existence at the commencement
of a lease.74 According to these analyses, the failure to maintain an ade-
quate level of security constitutes a breach of the warranty of
habitability.75
In Trentacost v. Brussel,76 the New Jersey Supreme Court employed
72. Haines, supra note 11, at 327. For a listing of cases which reject the
special relationship theory, see supra note 59.
73. See Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980). In
Trentacost, a tenant brought suit against her landlord after she was mugged in the
hallway of her apartment building. Id. at 218, 412 A.2d at 438. The court held
that since criminal activity "affecting" the apartment building was reasonably
foreseeable, the landlord was negligent in not providing adequate security meas-
ures. Id. at 219-20, 412 A.2d at 441. The court, however, also imposed liability
because the landlord breached the implied warranty of habitability by not fur-
nishing reasonable security measures. Id. at 227-28, 412 A.2d at 443. In addi-
tion, the court imposed liability because the landlord had violated administrative
regulations. Id. at 229-31, 412 A.2d at 443-45. See also Brownstein v. Edison,
103 Misc. 2d 316, 425 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (once installed, security
devices are within scope of warranty of habitability statute to extent that such
security is essential service to building). Accord Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev.
v. Layfield, 88 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 28, 152 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1978) (landlord's duty
to provide security measures can be part of warranty of habitability allowing ten-
ant to deduct rent for breach).
74. See, e.g., Kline, 439 F.2d at 485. The Kline court stated:
[T]here is implied in the contract between landlord and tenant an obli-
gation on the landlord to provide those protective measures which are
within his reasonable capacity . . . . 'Since the lessees continue to pay
the same rent, they were entitled to expect that the landlord would con-
tinue to keep the premises in their bargaining condition during the
lease term. It is precisely such expectations that the law now recognizes
as deserving of formal, legal protection.'
Id. (citingJavins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970)).
75. See, e.g., Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Inv. Trust, 503 F. Supp. 1157,
1160 (D. Kan. 1980) (failure "to maintain the level of security imposed at the
beginning of plaintiff's lease term result[ed] in a breach of an implied warranty
to maintain the conditions"); Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 228, 412 A.2d
436, 443 (1980) ("By failing to provide adequate security, the landlord has im-
paired the habitability of the tenant's apartment. He has therefore breached his
implied warranty of habitability.").
76. 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1982).
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the warranty of habitability to impose a duty of protection on a landlord,
but only after the court imposed liability based on traditional negligence
principles. 7 7 In utilizing the warranty of habitability theory, the court
stated that "[s]ince the landlord's implied undertaking to provide ade-
quate security exists independently of his knowledge of any [security]
risks, there is no need to prove notice of a defective and unsafe condi-
tion to establish the landlord's contractual duty." 78 This statement,
however, has caused concern among legal scholars because it implies
that a landlord could be held strictly liable for criminal assaults upon his
tenants.
79
77. Id. at 220-21, 412 A.2d at 440-43. The Trentacost court noted that in
previous cases it had utilized traditional negligence principles to hold a landlord
liable. Id. at 220-24, 412 A.2d at 440-41 (citing Braitman v. Overlook Terrace
Apartments, 68 N.J. 268, 346 A.2d 76 (1975)). Under the traditional negligence
analysis, the Trentacost court stated that if a reasonable, prudent person would
foresee danger resulting from another's voluntary criminal acts, the fact that
such acts are beyond the defendant's control does not preclude liability. Id. at
222, 412 A.2d at 440. "Foreseeability of harm, not the fact of another's inter-
vention, is the crucial factor in determining 'whether a duty exists to take meas-
ures to guard against [criminal activity].' " Id. at 223, 412 A.2d at 441 (quoting
Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293
(1962)) (emphasis provided by Goldberg court).
The Trentacost court also noted that its Braitman decision raised the possibil-
ity that a landlord could be held liable for unsafe premises based upon the war-
ranty of habitability. Id. at 223-24, 412 A.2d at 441. The court then "[took] this
opportunity to clarify the scope of a residential landlord's duty to his tenant,"
and ruled that by failing to provide adequate security, the landlord had impaired
the warranty of habitability and was liable to the plaintiff. Id. at 224, 412 A.2d at
441.
78. Id. at 228, 412 A.2d at 443.
79. See Browder, supra note 20, at 150 ("Strict liability has enjoyed limited
success even without the added intervention of third-party criminals."); Note,
Security: A New Standardfor Habitability, 42 U. Pirrs. L. REv. 415, 429 n.61 (1981)
(characterization of duty in Trentacost creates form of strict liability for
landlords).
It is submitted, however, that it was unclear whether the Trentacost decision
was intended to impose strict liability upon landlords. In addition to the fact
that no New Jersey cases have interpreted the Trentacost decision in such a way,
the language of the NewJersey opinion which adopted the warranty of habitabil-
ity makes such a conclusion virtually untenable. See Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
Given the Marini court's requirement that a tenant notify the landlord
before he may utilize the remedies for the landlord's breach of the warranty of
habitability, it is submitted that a New Jersey landlord could not be held liable
under the Trentacost warranty of habitability theory for criminal assault upon a
tenant unless the landlord had some type of notice that the premises did not
have adequate security. Although the Trentacost court stated that the landlord
does not need notice to establish his duty to provide protection under the war-
ranty of habitability, it is submitted that, based on the language of Marini, the
landlord would need notice of defective security before the tenant could exer-
cise his remedies for breach of the warranty of habitability. Compare Trentacost,
82 N.J. at 228, 412 A.2d at 443 with Marini, 56 N.J. at 146, 265 A.2d at 35. Based
on these inconsistencies between the Marini and Trentacost opinions, it is submit-
646
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In Brownstein v. Edison,80 New York also appeared to adopt the war-
ranty of habitability theory for imposing a duty of protection on land-
lords. 8 1 The Brownstein court stated that where a landlord assumes the
duty of installing security devices and increases the rent to recover the
costs of installation, the added security devices become a part of the
warranty of habitability if they can be considered an "essential service
affecting the habitability [of the building]." '8 2
A troublesome problem with utilizing the implied warranty theory
to impose a duty of protection on landlords arises from the fact that the
remedies available for a breach of warranty are based on a contract the-
ory,8 3 whereas the plaintiffs who bring actions against their landlords to
recover for injuries inflicted by a criminal intruder normally seek to re-
ted that a landlord in New Jersey is not strictly liable under the Trentacost war-
ranty of habitability theory.
80. 103 Misc. 2d 316, 425 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup. Ct. 1980). In Brownstein, the
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the executors of the landlord's
estate, alleging that the death of a tenant (plaintiff's decedent) was caused by the
landlord's failure to replace and maintain locks on the front door of the apart-
ment building. Id. at 317, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 774. The plaintiff amended his com-
plaint to allege that the landlord's conduct also breached the implied warranty
of habitability. Id. The court held that where a landlord provides security, that
degree of security which is an "essential service" of the building comes within
the warranty of habitability. Id. at 318, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
81. Id. at 318, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
82. Id. The court noted that a landlord is not a guarantor of his tenant's
safety. Id. The court also justified its decision by referring to the "burgeoning
cancer of crime [which] has made our citizens veritable hermits in their homes."
Id. (quoting People v. Gruenberg, 67 Misc. 2d 185, 188, 324 N.Y.S.2d 372, 376
(Crim. Ct. 1971)).
It is noted that the Brownstein court's holding may be read narrowly so that
the warranty of habitability would include security devices only where the land-
lord has provided such devices and increased the rent as a result of the cost of
increased security. See id. at 318, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 774.
83. See Pugh, 486 Pa. at 284, 295, 405 A.2d at 903, 908 (1979) (affirming
lower court's holding that lease is contract and that traditional contractual reme-
dies are available to enforce the implied warranty of habitability). See also Javins
v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.) (leases on urban dwelling
units should be interpreted and construed like any other contract), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
The remedies available for a breach of the implied warranty of habitability
include:
a) vacating the premises and terminating the obligation to pay rent;
b) refusing to pay rent, remaining in possession of the premises, and
using the warranty of habitability as a defense to an action by the
landlord to collect unpaid rent;
c) paying for necessary repairs from the rent due; and
d) pursuing other traditional contract remedies, such as specific
performance.
See Pugh, 486 Pa. at 291-95, 405 A.2d at 907-08. See also Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 226-
27, 412 A.2d at 443 (breach of warranty of habitability gives tenant right to de-
duct reasonable cost of repairs to vital facility from his monthly rent and right of
action for return or reduction of rent).
1986]
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cover in tort.8 4 This problem, however, did not prevent the Trentacost
court from utilizing the warranty of habitability to impose a duty of pro-
tection on landlords. 8 5 Although the Trentacost court recognized that
the tenant's traditional remedies for a breach of the warranty of habita-
bility were contract remedies, 86 the court stated that the warranty was
"flexible enough" to obligate a landlord to furnish such security for his
tenants as would safeguard them against foreseeable criminal conduct. 87
The court then concluded that by failing to provide such security, the
landlord had breached the warranty of habitability and was "liable to the
tenant for the injuries attributable to that breach." '88
4. Common Area Theory
A third theory employed by courts to impose a duty of protection
upon landlords requires landlords to take reasonable measures to pre-
vent foreseeable criminal activity from occurring in common areas of the
leased premises.8 9 Under the common area theory, the landlord's duty
84. Feld, 506 Pa. at 400 n.2, 485 A.2d at 750 n.2 (Zappala, J., concurring).
In his concurring opinion, Judge Zappala stated that in actions against a land-
lord for breach of an alleged duty to provide security, the plaintiffs usually seek
damages for personal injuries. Id. (Zappala, J., concurring). Judge Zappala
noted, however, that remedies under the warranty of habitability are contractual
in nature and, thus, inconsistent with the remedies sought in a tort action for
personal injury. Id. For a discussion of the remedies generally available under
the warranty of habitability, see supra note 83.
85. 82 NJ. at 225-28, 412 A.2d at 441-43. For a discussion of the Trentacost
opinion, see supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
86. 82 N.J. at 221, 412 A.2d at 440. The Trentacost court noted that a
breach of the implied warranty of habitability gave the tenant a right to deduct
the reasonable cost of repairs to a vital facility from his monthly rent and a right
of action for the return or reduction of rent. Id. at 227, 412 A.2d at 443. For a
discussion of the remedies for breach of warranty of habitability, see supra note
83.
87. 82 N.J. at 227-28, 412 A.2d at 443 (citing Braitman v. Overlook Terrace
Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 388, 346 A.2d 76, 97 (1975)).
88. Id. at 228, 412 A.2d at 443. The court did not address the question of
how the plaintiffs could recover in tort on the basis of the warranty of habitabil-
ity when the traditional remedies under the warranty were based on contract.
See id. at 225-29, 412 A.2d at 441-43. It is submitted that the court either consid-
ered the tenant's injuries as consequential damages for breach of contract or
used the warranty of habitability only to impose the duty of protection upon the
landlord, and then, after recognizing the existence of this duty, relied on tradi-
tional tort principles to allow the plaintiff to recover in tort because the duty had
been breached. See id. at 228, 412 A.2d at 443.
89. See Graham v. M &J Corp., 424 A.2d 103 (D.C. 1980); Spar v. Obwoya,
369 A.2d 173 (D.C. 1977); Ramsay v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969);
Whelan v. Docoma Enters., Inc., 394 So. 2d 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Hol-
ley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apts., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Scott v.
Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976); Loeser v. Nathan Hale Gardens,
Inc., 73 A.D.2d 187, 425 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1980); Sherman v. Concourse Realty
Corp., 47 A.D.2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1975).
The common area theory was also expressed in Johnston, 387 Mich. 569, 198
N.W.2d 409, and Samson, 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843. But the analysis in
648
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss2/5
1986] NOTE 649
to keep common areas safe and free from dangerous conditions is ex-
tended to include the duty to prevent the unreasonable risk of harm
from criminal assault.90 Thus, where the landlord could have discov-
ered an unreasonable risk of criminal intrusion through the exercise of
reasonable care and could have made the condition safe but did not do
so, he is subject to liability for the injuries inflicted upon a tenant during
a criminal intrusion. 9 1 Some courts have stated that this theory could be
utilized by a tenant who was attacked in his own apartment because in
such a case the criminal probably gained access to the apartment
through an entrance in a common area. 92 Therefore, the common area
theory is flexible enough to impose a duty of protection on landlords in
a variety of situations without making landlords insurers of their tenants'
safety. 93
these two Michigan cases relies on a much broader theory of liability based on a
special relationship between a landlord and tenant. For a discussion of Johnston
and Samson, see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
The common area theory has been adopted by the Restatement (Second) of
Property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Landlord & Tenant § 17.3 com-
ment 1, at 189 (1978). For the text of comment I to § 17.3, see supra note 11.
This theory emanates from the common area exception to the traditional rule of
nonliability for landlords. For a discussion of the common law exception to the
traditional rule of nonliability of landlords, see supra notes 18-27 and accompa-
nying text.
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Landlord & Tenant § 17.3
comment I at 197 (1977) ("For the purposes of this section, the unreasonable
risk of harm from criminal intrusion constitutes a dangerous condition.").
91. Id. Accord Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 169, 359 A.2d 548, 554 (1976)
("If the landlord knows, or should know, of criminal activity against persons or
property in the common areas, he then has a duty to take reasonable measures, in
view of the existing circumstances, to eliminate the conditions contributing to
the criminal activity.") (emphasis in original).
92. Kline, 439 F.2d at 480. See also O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp.
Intercoast Management, 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 803, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 490
(1977) (failure to safeguard common areas substantially contributed to injuries
of plaintiff who was assaulted in his own apartment); Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace
Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98, 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (intruder could
have entered decedent's apartment only through common walkway adjacent to
decedent's window).
93. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 169, 359 A.2d 548, 554 (1976). The
common area theory is flexible because the landlord has access to and control
over common areas, and his duty is to provide reasonable security measures in
view of the existing circumstances. Id. (emphasis added).
It has been suggested that the common area theory of imposing this duty
upon landlords may only apply to multi-unit dwellings. Haines, supra note 11, at
332 n.314. This suggestion is based upon the fact that the landlord of a multi-
unit dwelling, who is the only one with control over common areas, is in the
position to provide the security. Kline, 439 F.2d at 481. In a single-unit dwell-
ing, however, this reason for applying the common area theory is inapposite
because the tenant has control of all areas of the dwelling. Henszey & Weisman,
What Is the Landlord's Responsibility for Criminal Acts Committed on the Premises? 6 REAL
ESTATE L.J. 104, 123-24 (1977). While it may not be clear that the landlord has
no duty to provide security in a single-unit dwelling, it seems clear that in such a
building his duty would be less. See Graham v. M &J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 106
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Most courts that have relied upon the common area theory in im-
posing a duty of protection on landlords have employed a standard of
reasonableness and foreseeability under the circumstances. 9 4 There is
disagreement among the courts, however, regarding the degree of fore-
seeability necessary for a court to determine that the landlord's duty of
protection has been triggered. In Scott v. Watson, 95 the court took a nar-
row view of foreseeability, limiting the concept to include only the types
of criminal acts that previously had occurred on the landlord's premises
and of which the landlord knew or should have known.9 6 Other courts
have taken a much broader view of foreseeability, expanding the con-
cept to include not only crimes that had occurred on the landlord's
premises but also crimes that had occurred in the surrounding area. 9 7
Not all courts have accepted the common area theory for imposing
a duty of protection on landlords. These courts assert that the land-
lord's duty of care in common areas is restricted to keeping such areas
free from physical defects and does not include keeping them free from
criminal intrusion.9 8
(D.C. 1980). In Graham, the court stated that the Kline court specifically singled
out the landlord of an " 'urban multiple-unit apartment dwelling' as owing the
duty of protection. The building here was [a duplex] not a 'multiple unit apart-
ment,' so the duty owed may be less." Id. (citations omitted).
94. See, e.g., Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 169, 359 A.2d 548, 554 (1976).
In Scott, the court stated that "[i]f the landlord knows, or should know, of crimi-
nal activity against persons or property in the common areas [of the leased
premises], he then has a duty to take reasonable measures, in view of the existing
circumstances, to eliminate the conditions contributing to the criminal activity."
Id. (emphasis in original). The court stated that the reasonableness of the land-
lord's precautions are determined by the foreseeability of criminal conduct oc-
curring on the leased premises. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY, Landlord & Tenant § 17.3 comment I, at 189 (1977) ("[W]here the
landlord could by the exercise of reasonable care have discovered the unreasonable risk
of criminal intrusion and could have made the condition safe from such unrea-
sonable risk . . . he is subject to the liability . . Id. (emphasis added).
95. 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976).
96. Id. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554. The Scott court limited foreseeability to
prior crimes occurring on the landlord's premises because "the landlord can
affect the risk only within his own premises." Id. See also Sherman v. Concourse
Realty Corp., 47 A.D.2d 134, 135-36, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240-41 (1975) (empha-
sizing criminal activity within landlord's building).
97. See, e.g., Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173, 175 (D.C. 1977) (suggesting
that crime in neighborhood created landlord's duty); Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 218,
220, 222, 412 A.2d at 436, 438, 440 (1980) (criminal activity in neighborhood
affecting landlord's building created foreseeable risk of crime). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Landlord & Tenant § 17.3 comment I, illustration
18, at 189-90 (1977) (where the landlord of apartment building located in high
crime area could by exercise of reasonable care have discovered unreasonable
risk of criminal intrusion). For a discussion of the problems involved in adopt-
ing the view that crime in the neighborhood creates the landlord's duty, see
Note, supra note 40, at 1183-87.
98. See, e.g., Deem v. Smith Mgt., Inc., 799 F.2d 944, 946 (4th Cir. 1986)
(Virginia statute requiring landlords to keep premises safe applied only to physi-
cal defects not criminal intrusion); Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d
650 [Vol. 31: p. 627
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5. Assumption of Duty Theory
Some of the courts that have found the foregoing theories inade-
quate to impose a duty of protection on landlords nevertheless have
been willing to hold a landlord liable under an assumption of duty the-
ory. Under this theory, a landlord is liable where he provides a security
system but negligently maintains it, and his negligence is the proximate
cause of a criminal assault upon a tenant. 9 9 Under the assumption of
duty theory, the landlord's duty generally has been limited to the extent
of his undertaking, and, thus, the tenant may rely only on that level of
security which reasonably could have been expected from the program
of security offered. ' 00
97, 100, 302 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1973) (landlord's duty in common areas is nor-
mally associated with duty to repair and not to police); Feld, 506 Pa. at 392, 485
A.2d at 746 (distinguishing landlord's duty to keep common areas free from
physical defects from landlord's duty to protect against criminal intruders). By
rejecting the common area theory, these courts have implicitly rejected the posi-
tion of the Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, Landlord
& Tenant § 17.3 comment 1, at 189 (1977). For the text of comment I to § 17.3,
see supra note 11.
99. See, e.g., Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 78 Ill. 2d 204, 209-10, 399
N.E.2d 596, 599 (1979) (citing Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 Ill. 2d 69,
74, 199 N.E.2d 769, 773-74 (1964)) (liability can arise from negligent perform-
ance of voluntary undertaking, but liability is limited to extent of undertaking);
Feld, 506 Pa. at 392-93, 485 A.2d at 746 (1984) (citing Pascarella v. Kelley, 378
Pa. 18, 105 A.2d 70 (1954)) (individual may be liable even when he has no duty
if he assumes duty, whether gratuitously or for consideration, and so negligently
performs that duty that another suffers damage). The Restatement (Second) of Torts
summarizes the assumption of duty theory:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render serv-
ices to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protec-
tion of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other
for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care
to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
100. See, e.g., Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 78 111. 2d 204,210, 399 N.E.2d
596, 599 (1979) (housing authority's duty limited by extent of undertaking);
Feld, 506 Pa. at 394, 485 A.2d at 747 (tenant may rely on program of protection
only to extent of his reasonable expectations of the program). While Illinois
generally follows the more traditional Pippin approach to imposing liability on
landlords for criminal intrusion against tenants, the Illinois courts have made
exceptions to this analysis. See Stribling v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 34 Ill. App. 3d
551, 340 N.E.2d 47 (1975). In Stribling, the Illinois Appellate Division held the
Chicago Housing Authority liable when a burglar used the same vacant apart-
ment three times to gain access to neighboring apartments. Id. at 555-56, 340
N.E.2d at 50. After acknowledging that the tenant had notified the authority of
the unauthorized uses of the unoccupied apartment, the court stated:
Given the bizarre facts alleged in the complaint, it is our decision
that defendants owed plaintiffs no duty to guard against the [first] bur-
glary .... However, after defendants had notice of the original bur-
NOTE
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The limited extent of a landlord's duty under this theory was evi-
dent in Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority, 10 1 where a public housing au-
thority, 10 2 as landlord, had hired a third party to provide security
services. Relying on the principle that a landlord has no duty to protect
tenants or others from criminal intrusion unless he has assumed the
duty to do so,' ° 3 the Pippin court stated that since the authority had not
undertaken to perform the guard service itself, the authority was not
under a duty to protect Pippin.10 4 The court explained that the housing
authority could be held liable only to the extent of its undertaking,
which was to use reasonable care in hiring a security service.1 0 5 There-
fore, the court stated that the authority could be held liable only for
negligent hiring. 10 6
glary and the means used in effecting the burglary, the fact that another
burglary could happen in the same fashion became eminently
foreseeable.
Id. at 556, 340 N.E.2d at 50. The Stribling court concluded that the defendants
owed the plaintiffs a duty to guard against the second and third burglaries. Id.
101. 78 Ill. 2d 204, 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979).
102. In Pippin, although the defendant housing authority was a public cor-
poration, no issue of immunity was raised. See id. The issue of municipal immu-
nity is beyond the scope of this note. It is submitted that housing authorities
generally will be judged by legal principles applicable to private property own-
ers, either because municipal immunity has been abrogated by statute or be-
cause its operations will be deemed proprietary rather than governmental, thus
rendering it liable under common law. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 19, § 131 (discussing governmental immunity of municipal corporations);
Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence or Strict Lia-
bility?, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 19, 78-81 (discussing governmental immunity as ap-
plied to public housing authorities); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 3d 331, 341-62 (1972)
(discussing landlord's duty to protect against crime); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 1246,
1246-53 (1958) (discussing liability of public housing authorities).
103. 78 Ill. App. 2d at 208, 399 N.E.2d at 598.
104. Id. at 208, 399 N.E.2d at 599. Pippin was visiting a resident of a hous-
ing project owned by the Chicago Housing Authority. Id. at 206, 399 N.E.2d at
597. The resident asked security guards to remove Pippin from her apartment,
but to do so was beyond the guards' authority. Id. at 206, 399 N.E.2d at 597-98.
After Pippin voluntarily entered the lobby, a scuffle ensued between Pippin and
the resident, and Pippin was stabbed before the guards could stop the fight. Id.
at 206, 399 N.E.2d at 598. The fact that Pippin was not a tenant but a guest did
not affect the court's analysis because generally a landlord owes the same duty to
his tenants' guests as he owes to his tenants. See, e.g., Williams v. Alfred N. Ko-
plin & Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d 482, 448 N.E.2d 1042 (1983) (landlord's duty to
maintain premises is same whether injured party is tenant, tenant's employee, or
tenant's guest).
105. 78 Il. App. 2d at 211-12, 399 N.E.2d at 599.
106. Id. It should be noted that this is the same type of theory and analysis
adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme court in Feld. See 506 Pa. at 394, 485 A.2d
at 746-47. The Feld court stated:
A tenant may rely upon a program of protection only within the
reasonable expectations of the program. He cannot expect that a land-
lord will defeat all the designs of felonry. He can expect, however, that
the program will be reasonably pursued and not fail due to its negligent
exercise. If a landlord offers protection during certain periods of the
[Vol. 31: p. 627
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6. Violation of Statute or Ordinance Requiring Security
Another theory used to impose a duty of protection on landlords
depends on a landlord's violation of a regulation requiring landlords to
provide a minimum degree of security. In Trentacost v. Brussel10 7 an ap-
plicable regulation'"8 required landlords to equip the entranceways and
doors of multiple-unit apartment buildings with heavy-duty lock sets.' 0 9
The landlord had provided faulty locks, and the court relied on the land-
lord's violation of the regulation as evidence of the landlord's negli-
gence. 110 Questions have arisen, however, as to whether such statutes
day or night a tenant can only expect reasonable protection during the
periods offered. If, however, during the periods offered, the protection
fails by a lack of reasonable care, and that lack is the proximate cause of
the injury, the landlord can be held liable.
Id. at 394, 485 A.2d at 747.
107. 82 NJ. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980).
108. Id. at 229-30, 412 A.2d at 444 (citing Hotel and Multiple Dwelling
Health Law (currently codified as amended at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:13A-1 to -19
(West Supp. 1985)). The Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Law delegated power to
the State Commission of Community Affairs to promulgate regulations concern-
ing apartment buildings. Id. § 55:13A-7. In the "Regulation for the Construc-
tion and Maintenance of Motels and Multiple Dwellings," the commissioner
required that heavy-duty locks be installed. Regulation for the Construction and
Maintenance of Motels and Multiple Dwellings, Reg. 602.3(f)(2)(i) (effective July
19, 1968) (as amended by NJ. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5:10, § 19.6(c)(2) (1985)) (re-
codified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5:10, § 19.2(a)(6) (1984)).
109. Regulation for the Construction and Maintenance of Motels and Mul-
tiple Dwellings, Reg. 602.3(f)(2)(i) (effectiveJuly 19, 1968) (as amended by NJ.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 5:10, § 19.6(c)(2) (1985)) (recodified at N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit.
5:10, § 19.2(a)(6) (1984)).
110. Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 230-31, 412 A.2d at 444-45 (1980). The court
stated: "The statutory and regulatory scheme governing the habitability of mul-
tifamily dwellings establishes a standard of conduct for landlords. It is thus
available as evidence for determining the duty owed by landlords to tenants." Id.
(citing Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 383, 346 A.2d 76, 84
(1975)). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (1965). Section 288B
explains that a violation of a statute may be used in proving negligence:
(1) The unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an adminis-
trative regulation which is adopted by the court as defining the stan-
dard of conduct of a reasonable man, is negligence in itself.
(2) The unexcused violation of an enactment or regulation which is
not so adopted may be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negli-
gent conduct.
Id. The Trentacost court considered the landlord's violation of an enactment as
evidence of negligence. Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 299-31, 412 A.2d at 444.
In Nixon v. Mr. Propert Management Co., the Texas Supreme Court reversed
summary judgment in favor of the defendant landlord, and held that a landlord
who violated a Dallas city ordinance could be held liable for the rape of a 10-
year-old girl which occurred in a vacant apartment of the defendant's building.
690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985). The applicable ordinance required that a property
owner keep the doors and windows of a vacant structure or a portion of a vacant
structure secured to prevent unauthorized entry. Id. at 548 (citing DALLAS REV.
CODE OF CIVIL & CRIMINAL ORDINANCES § 27.11 (a)(6)). Even though the victim
was not a resident of the defendant's apartment building but was forcibly taken
there by her assailant, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that since the ordi-
NOTE
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apply only to common areas.1 II Moreover, if such a statute is unclear, a
court may interpret a requirement that a building be kept "safe" and
"decent" as applicable to physical defects only and not to the provision
of security. 1 2 Since the statute in Trentacost explicitly required a land-
lord to equip doors with heavy-duty locks, the problem of interpreting
an ambiguous statute did not arise.1 13
III. THE FELD DECISION
In Feld, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to depart from the
traditional view that landlords owe no general duty of protection to ten-
ants. 114 The case arose after Peggy and Samuel Feld were accosted at
gunpoint by three armed men1 15 in the parking garage of the Cedar-
brook Apartments where they lived. 116 The Felds were forced into a car
nance was designed to prevent the type of harm which the victim suffered, the
ordinance created a duty of protection in the defendant. Id. at 549. The court
concluded that if the trier of fact were to find that the defendant unjustifiably
violated the Dallas city ordinance, the defendant would be negligent per se. Id.
11. See Trentacost, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980). See also Michaels v.
Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 386-87, 140 A.2d 199, 203 (1958) (court ruled
that statute covered not only common area but "all parts" which the landlord
provided). It is noted that the Restatement (Second) of Property classifies door locks
on the entrances to tenants' apartments as within the landlord's control because
he is the only one with the authority to make the necessary changes to avoid an
unreasonable risk of harm. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.3 com-
ment 1 (1977).
112. Deem v. Smith Mgt., Inc., 799 F.2d 944, 946 (4th Cir. 1986) (Virginia
statute requiring landlords to keep premises safe applied only to physical defects
not criminal intrusion); Pippin v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 78 I1. 2d 204, 399
N.E.2d 596 (1979) (language in statute requiring housing authority to provide
"decent, safe and sanitary dwellings" was construed to apply only to physical
condition of premises).
113. See 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436.
114. 506 Pa. at 395, 485 A.2d at 746. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
adhered to this position despite lower court opinions suggesting that Penn-
sylvania would choose to impose some type of duty of protection upon land-
lords. See Skalski v. Baumholtz, 1 Phila. 332 (Pa. C.P. 1977), aff'd, 256 Pa. Super.
595, 389 A.2d 208 (1978) (per curiam). For a discussion of the traditional ap-
proach to imposing a duty of protection upon landlords, see notes 37-40 and
accompanying text.
115. 506 Pa. at 389, 485 A.2d at 744. The assailants were apprehended and
convicted for the crimes perpetrated on the Felds. See Commonwealth v. Guess,
266 Pa. Super. 359, 404 A.2d 1330 (1979).
116. 506 Pa. at 389, 485 A.2d at 744. The Cedarbrook Apartment Com-
plex comprised approximately 1000 apartment units located on a 36-acre tract
of land in Cheltenham, Pennsylvania. Feld v. Merriam, 314 Pa. Super. 414,423,
461 A.2d 225, 229 (1983). Access to the grounds could be gained by vehicle
through two entrances, each of which was manned by security guards from 3:00
p.m. to 9:00 a.m. every day. Id. at 423 & n.2, 461 A.2d at 229 & n.2. Security
personnel were also stationed at the entrances to each building. Id. at 423, 461
A.2d at 229. One guard patrolled the premises on foot and another patrolled
the premises by car at irregular intervals. Id. All security services were provided
by Globe Security Services. Id.
[Vol. 31: p. 627
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and driven past a security guard who was on duty at the entrance of the
apartment complex. 1 7 After leaving the complex with the Felds, the
assailants raped Mrs. Feld several times before they released her. 
1 S
Before the assault on the Felds, the incidence of crime had been rising,
both in the area surrounding the complex and on the complex
grounds.' 19 Although the tenants' association had suggested that more
security measures be installed, the apartment management had refused
to provide more. 120 After the incident, the Felds sued the owners of the
Cedarbrook Apartments, 12 1 alleging that they had breached a duty of
protection and, thereby, had caused the Felds' injuries.12 2 Thejury re-
turned a verdict for the Felds.
123
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that it was
consistent with current Pennsylvania landlord-tenant law to require
landlords to provide adequate security for tenants. 124 The court ex-
plained that the landlord's duty is to take reasonable care in protecting
tenants from criminal intrusion that is foreseeable under the circum-
stances. 12 5 The court concluded that sufficient evidence had been
117. 314 Pa. Super. at 424 n.6, 461 A.2d at 230 n.6.
118. Id. at 424-25, 461 A.2d at 230. Before raping Mrs. Feld, the assailants
threatened to lock Mr. Feld in the trunk of the car. Id. at 424, 461 A.2d at 230.
Mrs. Feld told the men that because of Mr. Feld's emphysema he would be un-
able to breath if he were put into the trunk. Id. The assailants released Mr. Feld
after Mrs. Feld said she would do anything they wished if they promised not to
harm her husband. Id.
119. Id. at 423, 461 A.2d at 229.
120. Id. at 424, 461 A.2d at 230. Globe Security Services also had sug-
gested the use of additional security measures. Id. at 423, 461 A.2d at 230. The
company's recommendations included better lighting in the garages, installation
of mechanical garage doors, more security guards to patrol the complex, and
decals for tenants' cars so the guards could better screen the cars entering the
complex. Id. at 424, 461 A.2d at 230.
121. 506 Pa. at 289, 485 A.2d at 744. Cedarbrook Apartments was owned
by John W. Merriam and Thomas Wynne, Inc. Id. at 389 n.2, 485 A.2d at 744
n.2. Merriam owned all of the stock of Thomas Wynne, Inc., and was treated as
its sole owner. Id.
122. Id. at 389, 485 A.2d at 744-45.
123. Id. at 390 n.3, 485 A.2d at 745 n.3. Thejury in the trial court awarded
Mr. Feld one million dollars in damages and one and one-half million dollars in
punitive damages. Id. Mrs. Feld was awarded two million dollars in compensa-
tory damages and one and one-half million dollars in punitive damages. Id.
124. Feld v. Merriam, 314 Pa. Super. 414, 427, 461 A.2d 225, 230 (1983).
In the Pennsylvania Superior Court the Feld case was heard by Judges Hester,
Cirillo, and Johnson. Judge Cirillo wrote the opinion of the court.
125. Id. at 427-28, 461 A.2d at 232. The court stated that "[a]n act or omis-
sion may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an
unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third
person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal."
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965)).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court also stated that, in order to establish a
prima facie case of negligence against a landlord for his failure to provide secur-
ity, a plaintiff must
present evidence showing that the landlord had notice of criminal activ-
29
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presented for the jury to determine that the attack on the Felds was rea-
sonably foreseeable and that the landlord's duty of protection had been
activated. '
26
In reversing and remanding the superior court's decision, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court observed that crime is a social problem that can
affect anyone at any time and in any place. 12 7 The supreme court stated
that imposing a general duty of protection on landlords would make
them insurers of their tenants' safety.
128
Addressing the argument that the landlord had a duty of protection
under the special relationship theory, 129 the supreme court acknowl-
edged similarities between the landlord-tenant and property owner-
business invitee relationship. 130 The court, however, proceeded to dis-
tinguish these relationships and explained the different duties imposed
ity which posed risk of harm to his tenants, that he had the means to
take precautions to protect the tenant against this risk of harm, and that
his failure to do so was the proximate cause of the tenant's injuries.
Id. at 428, 461 A.2d at 232.
126. Id. at 429-30, 461 A.2d at 233. In reaching its decision the court re-
jected Cedarbrook's argument that the crime was not foreseeable because the
company did not have prior notice of sexual assaults occurring on the premises.
Id. at 429, 461 A.2d at 233 (citing Morgan v. Bucks Assocs., 428 F. Supp. 546,
551 (E.D. Pa. 1977)). The court also rejected Cedarbrook's argument that the
crime was not foreseeable because no crime had ever occurred in the garage
where the Felds were accosted. Id. at 430, 461 A.2d at 233 (citing Murphy v.
Penn Fruit Co., 274 Pa. Super. 427, 418 A.2d 480 (1980)).
127. See Feld, 506 Pa. at 392, 485 A.2d at 746 (crime can be expected any-
where at any time); id. at 402-03, 485 A.2d at 751 (Zappala, J., concurring)
(crime is social problem not peculiar to landlord-tenant relationship).
128. Id. at 392, 485 A.2d at 746. Explaining its decision, the supreme court
distinguished the risk of harm from physical defects in the leased property and
the risk of harm from the criminal conduct of third persons. Id. The court
stated that the risk of harm from a physical defect is a risk caused by the landlord
whereas the risk of harm from criminal activity arises from the conduct of an
unpredictable independent agent. Id. The court, therefore, reasoned that the
duty to protect tenants from physical defects could not be extended to include a
duty to protect tenants from crime. Id. The supreme court concluded that in
failing to make this "crucial" distinction, the superior court had made a landlord
an insurer of his tenants' safety. Id.
129. For a discussion of the special relationship theory of imposing a duty
of protection upon landlords, see supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
130. 506 Pa. at 390, 485 A.2d at 745 (citing Leary v. Lawrence Sales Corp.,
442 Pa. 389, 275 A.2d 32 (1971) (where owner of real estate leases various parts
of property to tenants but retains control of common areas used by tenants'
invitees, owner is liable to invitees for injuries caused by negligent maintenance
of premises).
In Pennsylvania, the landowner-business invitee relationship imposes spe-
cial obligations on the landlords, as summarized in the Second Restatement of Torts:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his
business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while
they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by
the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons
or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable
care to
656
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol31/iss2/5
1986] NOTE 657
by each. Describing the property owner-business invitee relationship,
the court stated that an owner who invites the public onto his property
reasonably may expect that some people will misbehave and fail to act
with reasonable care while on his land; the owner, therefore, incurs a
duty to protect his invitees from such misbehavior.' 3 ' In contrast, the
court explained that the landlord does not invite the public into his
apartment building and does not profit from the public's presence
there.132 The landlord, therefore, is not obligated to "bear what loses
that public may create."1 3 3 Relying on this distinction, the court con-
cluded that a landlord generally has no duty to protect tenants against
criminal intrusion, but held that a landlord may incur a duty of protec-
tion if he voluntarily or by express agreement provides a program of
security. 134
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPACT OF FELD
In Feld, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in effect applied the policy
of holding a landlord liable only for misfeasance and not for nonfea-
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done,
or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the
harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965) (adopted in Pennsylvania along
with comment f to § 344 in Moran v. Valley Forge Drive-In Theater, Inc., 431
Pa. 432, 435-36, 246 A.2d 875, 878 (1968)).
131. 506 Pa. at 391, 485 A.2d at 745.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 392-93, 485 A.2d at 747 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 323 (1977)). For the text of section 323, see supra note 100. The court
stressed that absent an agreement or voluntary undertaking a landlord has no
duty of protection. Id. at 393, 485 A.2d at 747. The court defined a program of
security as something more than the normal precautions that a reasonable
homeowner would take, such as personnel specifically charged to patrol the
premises, which could induce the tenants' reliance on the landlord's efforts. Id.
at 394, 485 A.2d at 747.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Zappala recognized that leases are viewed
today as contracts that contain a warranty of habitability, but nevertheless stated
that "[o]nly the most fainthearted and seclusive could accept the proposition
that lack of [security] services would render a residence uninhabitable." Id. at
400, 485 A.2d at 750 (Zappala, J., concurring). Justice Zappala also noted that
there is a clear distinction between a duty to keep common areas physically safe
and a duty to keep common areas safe from criminal intrusion. Id. at 401, 485
A.2d at 750-51 (Zappala, J., concurring). He explained that a landlord may be
liable when a tenant is injured as a result of a defective physical condition in the
leased premises because in such a situation the landlord's conduct created the
risk. Id. at 402, 485 A.2d at 751. (Zappala, J., concurring). When a tenant is
injured as a result of the criminal conduct of another, however, Justice Zappala
stated that the landlord is not liable because he did not cause the injury. Id.
Justice Zappala also concluded that a landlord may incur such a duty of protec-
tion by providing security services. Id. at 403, 485 A.2d at 751 (Zappala, J.,
concurring).
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sance,' 3 5 and indicated its reluctance to depart from the traditional rule
that a landlord has no duty to protect his tenants against criminal as-
sault. 13 6 With the Feld decision, Pennsylvania joined the jurisdictions 137
that have refused to accept the position adopted by the Second Restatement
of Property that the landlord's duty to keep common areas safe implies a
duty to keep tenants safe from criminal intrusion. 13 8
The Feld court elected to impose only a narrow duty of protection
on landlords, in part, because of the court's express fear that the imposi-
tion of a general duty of protection would make landlords the insurers
of their tenants' safety. 13 9 It is submitted that the court's reluctance to
impose a general duty on landlords was also based on the court's recog-
nition that the foreseeability standard is a vague and uncertain guide for
fashioning landlords' conduct.140
135. See 506 Pa. at 392, 485 A.2d at 746. It is submitted that the distinction
between misfeasance and nonfeasance is implicit in the Feld court's distinction
between liability for injuries caused by defects in the premises and liability for
the criminal acts of third persons. See id. The court stated that, by not repairing
a known physical defect, the landlord has perpetrated the injury while injury
from a criminal intruder results not from an act by the landlord but from an
independent third party. Id. The Feld court implied that in the former situation,
the landlord could be liable because his "perpetration" of the injury amounts to
misfeasance. Id. In the latter situation, however, the landlord could not be lia-
ble because his conduct amounts to nonfeasance. Id.
136. See id. at 391, 485 A.2d at 746. For a discussion of the traditional rule
regarding a landlord's duty to provide protection against criminal intrusion, see
supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
137. For a discussion of the common area theory and of those jurisdictions
rejecting this theory, see supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.3 comment 1 (1977).
For the text of comment I to § 17.3, see supra note 11.
139. See 506 Pa. at 392, 485 A.2d at 746. The court stated, "To impose a
general duty ... would effectively require landlords to be insurers of their ten-
ants' safety: a burden which could never be completely met given the unfortu-
nate realities of modern society." Id. This concern is not unique to the Feld
court. See Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291
(1962). Accord Kline, 439 F.2d at 484 (landlord is not insurer of tenants' safety).
For a related discussion of the possibility of making a landlord an insurer of his
tenants' safety by imposing a general duty of protection, see supra notes 65-66 &
infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
140. Other courts have also recognized the problem involved in basing
landlord liability on a vague foreseeability standard. See, e.g., 7735 Hollywood
Blvd. Venture v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 901, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528
(1981); Smith v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 36 Ill. App. 3d 967, 344 N.E.2d 536
(1976); Trice v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973);
Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962); accord
Riley v. Marcus, 125 Cal. App. 3d 103, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1981); Graham v. M
& J Corp., 424 A.2d 103, 110-12 (D.C. 1980) (Nebeker, J., dissenting); King v.
Ilikai Properties Inc., 632 P.2d 651 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983).
It is noted, however, that this problem arguably is not unique to defining a
landlord's duty of protection because all of tort law can be viewed as similarly
vague. See Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 605, 186 A.2d
291, 305 (1962) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (duty to take reasonable precautions is
no more vague than test of reasonableness throughout law). See also Note, supra
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Because crime can be expected "anywhere any time" in modern so-
ciety, 14 1 the main issue for courts using the foreseeability standard is
determining when to consider a particular crime foreseeable.14 2 Recog-
nizing this issue, the Kline court defined as foreseeable those crimes that
are predictable and probable.143 Because it is impossible to predict ex-
actly where and when a crime will occur, however, even this seemingly
clear guide is uncertain. 144 Recognizing this uncertainty, courts apply-
ing a foreseeability analysis have narrowed the definition of foreseeabil-
ity to limit the burden on landlords. 145
In spite of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's fear that imposing a
duty of protection upon landlords would make landlords insurers of
their tenants' safety, the court's reluctance to impose such a duty upon
landlords is somewhat puzzling in light of the court's landmark decision
in Pugh v. Holmes, where the court held that the warranty of habitability is
note 40, at 1180. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 173
(discussing reasonable person test).
Opponents of the foreseeability standard contend that the lack of guidance
under the standard makes it impossible for the landlord to realize the scope of
his duty. See Goldberg, 38 N.J. at 583-84, 186 A.2d at 293. Therefore, it is gener-
ally accepted that foreseeability alone is not a proper basis for imposing liability
upon the landlord. Id. at 583, 186 A.2d at 293. Rather, "whether a duty exists is
... a question of fairness .... the relationship of the parties, the nature of the
risk and the public interest in the proposed solution." Id. (emphasis in original).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Feld did not cite Goldberg, but it did weigh
the interests suggested by the Goldberg court before reaching its holding. See 314
Pa. Super. at 427-30, 461 A.2d at 231-33.
Courts and commentators also have recognized another problem with the
foreseeability standard-any case which goes to a jury under general instruc-
tions on the foreseeability of a heinous crime which has been committed inevita-
bly results in a verdict for the plaintiff. See Browder, supra note 20, at 153 ("Most
people are angry and frustrated about the prevalence of violent crime, and about
the inability of victims to do anything about it; they are likely to take any means
offered to shift the burden of crime prevention from innocent victims."). See also
Riley v. Marcus, 125 Cal. App. 3d 103, 109, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827, 831 (1981) ("It
would be intolerable and grossly unfair to permit a lay jury, after the fact, to
determine in any case that security measures were 'inadequate,' especially in
light of the fact that the decision would always be rendered in a case where the
security had in fact proved to be inadequate.") (quoting 1735 Hollywood Blvd.
Venture v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. App. 3d 901, 905, 172 Cal. Rptr. 528, 532
(1981)). The problem is that with hindsight, juries find that more security meas-
ures should have been made available because the security in place at the time of
intrusion was inadequate. See Riley, 125 Cal. App. 3d at 109, 177 Cal. Rptr. at
830.
141. See, e.g., Feld, 506 Pa. at 391, 485 A.2d at 746.
142. For a discussion of this issue and how other courts have approached it,
see supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
143. Kline, 439 F.2d at 483 (citing Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459
(1947)). For a discussion of Kline, see supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
144. For a discussion of the unpredictability of urban crime and why it is
unpredictable, see Note, supra note 40, at 1183-87.
145. See, e.g., Scott, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (foreseeability limited to
crimes which had occurred in premises and of which landlord had notice).
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implied in every residential lease. 146 In adopting the warranty of habita-
bility, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that "times have
changed"'147 in the landlord-tenant relationship and that, as between
the two parties, the landlord has more bargaining power and greater
control.' 4 8 In essence, by adopting the warranty of habitability, courts
and legislatures have impliedly recognized that the landlord-tenant rela-
tionship is a special one in which the landlord dominates the tenant and
the tenant needs protection. 149 Because the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has adopted the warranty of habitability, it is unclear why the
court decided that, absent a special agreement, a landlord has no duty to
provide security against criminal intrusion. 150
146. 486 Pa. 272, 284, 405 A.2d 897, 903 (1979). Pugh imposed on land-
lords a duty to provide secure windows and doors and held that this duty is
breached only if the premises are unfit for habitation. Id. at 289, 405 A.2d at
905 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the Pugh decision, see supra notes 30-
33 and accompanying text.
147. Pugh, 486 Pa. at 280, 405 A.2d at 901.
148. See id. at 282-83, 405 A.2d at 902 (tenants today can have vastly infer-
ior bargaining power as compared with landlords); Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.) (severe housing shortage increases land-
lord's bargaining position), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). For a discussion of
the warranty of habitability, see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
149. SeeJavins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Pugh, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897; Note, supra
note 79, at 427-28. One commentator has suggested that when security is inade-
quate a tenant's health and safety are in jeopardy, which is exactly the type of
situation the warranty of habitability was designed to prevent. See Comment,
supra note 71, at 707.
150. It is submitted that the Feld court could have based the imposition of
such a duty on either the special relationship theory or common area theory.
For a discussion of why courts that have adopted the warranty of habitability
theory should impose a duty of protection upon landlords, see Note, supra note
79, at 427-28 (implied warranty of habitability recognizes that landlord-tenant
relationship is special one in which tenant needs protection).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in its Feld opinion, stated that its opinion
was consistent with current trends in Pennsylvania landlord-tenant law. Feld,
314 Pa. Super. at 427, 461 A.2d at 231. The superior court emphasized that
"[w]hen American city dwellers . . .seek shelter today, they seek a well known
package of goods and services-a package which includes not merely walls and
ceilings, but adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities,
secure windows and doors." Id. at 426-27, 461 A.2d at 231 (quoting Pugh, 486 Pa. at
282, 405 A.2d at 902) (emphasis added by Feld court). The superior court indi-
cated that the reference to secure doors and windows in Pugh led to the conclu-
sion that a landlord, while not an insurer of his tenant's safety, is under a duty to
provide adequate security measures in all areas of his leasehold, particularly ar-
eas under his control. Id.
In Pugh, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also recognized that a lease
should be viewed as a contract rather than a conveyance of land and held that
the warranty of habitability was implied in all residential leases in the Common-
wealth. 486 Pa. at 279-84, 405 A.2d at 900-03. For a further discussion of Pugh,
see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. The Feld decision, however, re-
flects the traditional view that a landlord has no duty to protect his tenants ab-
sent agreement or a special relationship. See 506 Pa. at 392, 485 A.2d at 746.
For a discussion of the traditional view regarding a landlord's duty to provide
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Although the precise impact of the Feld decision is unclear, '5 there
are several aspects of the court's decision that could create problems for
Pennsylvania courts and litigants. First, by limiting a landlord's liability
for the results of criminal intrusion to those cases where a landlord has
provided a program of security, the court is punishing landlords who
recognize a potential risk and try to eliminate it, while sparing landlords
who provide no security programs. Such a policy could have the obvi-
ous effect of discouraging landlords from providing any security at
all.152 It is arguable, of course, that the free marketplace will eliminate
this problem because competition to attract and retain tenants will in-
duce landlords to provide security 153 while protecting themselves with
insurance 154 and passing the costs on to their tenants. 155 Although
such a solution may be viable in affluent housing markets, it is problem-
atic in poorer areas where tenants cannot afford to absorb increased
rents, where insurance is more expensive and more difficult to obtain,
and where security is even more necessary because poorer neighbor-
hoods generally have higher crime rates. 156
protection against criminal intrusion, see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying
text.
151. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case. 506 Pa. at 397,
485 A.2d at 748. Although the supreme court generally commended the trial
court, the supreme court stated that the jury instructions imposed a greater duty
than Pennsylvania was prepared to recognize. Id. at 385, 485 A.2d at 747. With
regard to the defendant landlord, the issues on remand will be (1) whether the
defendants agreed or volunteered to provide a "program of security;" (2) if so,
whether the defendant performed that task in a reasonable manner; and (3) if he
did not perform the program of security in a reasonable manner, whether the
injuries suffered by the Felds were proximately caused by the defendant's breach
of duty. Id. at 396, 485 A.2d at 747.
152. See, e.g., Riley v. Marcus, 125 Cal. App. 3d 103, 109-10, 177 Cal. Rptr.
827, 831 (1981). The Riley court stated that a landlord's efforts to secure his
premises and protect his tenants against criminal intrusion should not automati-
cally render him liable if such efforts fail. Id. Rather, the court indicated, a
landlord should incur no liability by attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to make
his premises less vulnerable to criminal intrusion. Id. at 110, 177 Cal. Rptr. at
831. See also Haines, supra note 11, at 337 (landlords may be discouraged from
providing any security at all for fear of liability if they fail).
153. See, e.g., Feld, 506 Pa. at 393-94, 485 A.2d at 747 (landlord may provide
security even without duty to do so in order to attract and to keep tenants).
154. For a discussion of how landlords can protect themselves with insur-
ance and the problems involved, see Note, supra note 40, at 1198.
155. See Kline, 439 F.2d at 488 (in imposing duty of protection on landlords,
court is likely to allow landlords to pass increased costs of added security meas-
ures and insurance on to tenants).
156. It is noted that the Kline court stated that a landlord could pass the
costs of security on to his tenants. 439 F.2d at 488. The Feld court, however, did
not address this issue. One commentator has observed that in poorer neighbor-
hoods it may not be realistic to raise rents either because of the tenants' limited
finances or because of rent control legislation. Haines, supra note 11, at 351.
That commentator suggested that if liability is imposed on landlords for inade-
quate security, the financial burden of providing more security could force land-
lords of poorer tenants out of business, promoting urban decay and decreasing
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A second part of the Feld decision that raises questions is the court's
definition of a "program of security."1 5 7 The Feld court distinguished a
program of security from the normal precautions a reasonable home-
owner would take to protect his property. ' 58 A program of security, the
Feld court explained, "is an extra precaution, such as personnel specifi-
cally charged to patrol and protect the premises."' 5 9 It is suggested,
however, that this definition begs the question of whether a landlord has
a duty to provide basic security devices such as door locks or adequate
lighting; and, if the landlord does provide such devices, whether he will
be liable if a device fails and a criminal incident occurs in which a tenant
is injured. 160
It is submitted that in finding "no general duty of a landlord to pro-
tect tenants against criminal intrusion," 16 1 the Feld court could have re-
lieved landlords of the duty to provide even basic security devices. Such
a conclusion, however, is contrary to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
holding in Pugh,162 which mandated that all residential landlords have a
duty under the warranty of habitability to provide "secure windows and
doors."' 163 The ambiguity of the court's position regarding such basic
security devices was increased by Justice Zappala's concurring opinion
in Feld rejecting the Kline court's suggestion that a landlord is required
"in the first instance to provide any form of 'security services' or protec-
the supply of low-cost housing. Id. But see Selvin, Landlord Tort Liability for Crimi-
nal Attacks on Tenants: Developments Since Kline, 9 REAL ESTATE L.J. 311, 318
(1981) (no evidence of such dire consequences occurring since Kline).
157. See 506 Pa. at 393-94, 485 A.2d at 747.
158. Id. at 394, 485 A.2d at 747.
159. Id. The Feld court indicated that the security measures offered by the
Cedarbrook Apartments constituted a program of security. Id. For a discussion
of the program of security offered in Feld, see supra note 116.
160. It is suggested that these questions are significant because cases in
which a tenant sues a landlord for failing to provide security usually involve the
failure to provide such standard security devices. See, e.g., Kline, 439 F.2d 477
(unlocked door in addition to other security problems); Trentacost, 82 NJ. 214,
412 A.2d 436 (broken door lock on building); Braitman v. Overlook Terrace
Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975) (inadequate locks on door of plaintiff's
apartment); Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp., 48 A.D.2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d
239 (1975) (defective lobby door lock).
For a discussion of standard security devices that a landlord or homeowner
could provide, and more expensive security systems which are beyond the reach
of most landlords and homeowners, see Note, supra note 40, at 1189-94.
161. 506 Pa. at 393, 485 A.2d at 747 (emphasis added).
162. Pugh, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 879. For a discussion of Pugh and the
warranty of habitability, see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
163. Pugh, 486 Pa. at 282-83, 405 A.2d at 902 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 467-68, 329 A.2d 812, 820-21
(1974)). For a discussion of Pugh and the warranty of habitability, see supra
notes 30-33 and accompanying text. For a discussion of why the imposition of a
duty of protection upon landlords was consistent with Pugh, see supra note 150
and accompanying text.
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tive measures to meet the 'warranty of habitability.' ",164 Although it has
been suggested that Feld can be read consistently with Pugh, 16 5 it is at
best unclear exactly what is required of landlords in Pennsylvania after
Feld.
The real irony of the supreme court's opinion in Feld, however, is
that even if a landlord has a duty to provide standard security devices
under the warranty of habitability, the landlord may not be liable in tort
to his tenants if those basic devices fail. This conclusion is based on the
Feld court's holding that a landlord is not liable in tort unless he pro-
vides a "program of security", and under Feld the provision of basic se-
curity devices does not constitute a program of security.' 66 It is
submitted, however, that because Feld involved a situation in which the
landlord provided a "program of security,' 1 6 7 the decision can be lim-
ited to its facts, and not applied to a case where a landlord has failed
either to provide or to maintain basic security devices, such as door
locks and lighting.
A third ambiguity in Feld is the court's statement that a landlord
may incur a duty to protect his tenants against criminal intrusion by
either volunteering or agreeing to provide a program of security. 168 Ex-
actly when this duty begins, when it ends, and what conduct it involves
are questions the Feld court left unanswered. 16 9 As soon as a security
system has been installed, the landlord's duty is clearly triggered.
170
164. 506 Pa. at 399, 485 A.2d at 749 (Zappala,J., concurring) (emphasis in
original). Justice Zappala stated that it would be a "gross distortion" to apply
the Pugh reasoning to the Feld case. Id. at 400, 485 A.2d at 750 (Zappala, J.,
concurring). Thejustice concluded that "[o]nly the most fainthearted and seclu-
sive could accept the proposition that the lack of [security] would render a resi-
dence uninhabitable." Id. (footnote omitted).
165. See Note, Absent Agreement, Landlord Has No General Duty to Provide Tenant
with a Security Program, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 493 (1985) (suggesting that landlords may
be required to provide minimum security devices such as secure locks, doors,
windows, and bars on windows).
166. A similar conclusion was reached by a California court. Riley v. Mar-
cus, 125 Cal. App. 3d 103, 177 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1981). In Riley, the plaintiffs
argued that even though the landlord had no duty to protect the tenant against
unforeseeable criminal acts, the landlord should be held liable for failing to
maintain door locks, windows, and outside lighting. Id. at 109-10, 177 Cal. Rptr.
at 831. The court, however, rejected this argument because "[t]he items were
common place and furnished by virtually every landlord to every tenant." Id.
The Riley court, however, may have been influenced by the fact that by imposing
such liability they would punish landlords who try to make their premises more
secure. See id. For a discussion of this consideration with regard to the Feld case,
see supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
167. See 506 Pa. at 394, 485 A.2d at 747.
168. Id. at 393-94, 485 A.2d at 747.
169. See Leary v. Lawrence Sales Corp., 442 Pa. 389, 397, 275 A.2d 32, 36
(1971) (quoting W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 54, at 340 (3d ed. 1969)).
The Leay court noted that "[tihe quantity of evidence required to show a volun-
tary assumption of duty is not easily stated." Id. at 397, 275 A.2d at 36.
170. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, § 56, at 379 (where per-
1986] NOTE 663
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But under what circumstances and at what point prior to the final instal-
lation of the program does this duty arise? Will a landlord be liable if he
merely promises to provide a security system? At what point can a ten-
ant justifiably rely on such a program? 17 1 If a landlord volunteers to
perform this duty, how can he effectively terminate this duty? If a land-
lord raises the rent to provide a security program, will he be required to
decrease the rent if the program is discontinued or will it suffice simply
to notify his tenants? 172 In light of the Feld court's concern that the
landlord's assumption of the duty will create reliance by the tenant, 17 3 it
seems that the landlord's duty under Feld arises when the tenant reason-
ably relies on the landlord's assumption of responsibility for providing
security services. 17 4 It is submitted, however, that such an analysis
neither gives tenants adequate protection from criminal assault, nor as-
sists landlords in determining clearly when they have incurred a duty of
protection.
The final ambiguity under the Feld opinion is whether a landlord in
Pennsylvania who elects to provide a "program of security" must pro-
vide one which is reasonably designed to reduce the foreseeable risks of
crime or must merely use reasonable care in providing whatever pro-
gram of security he elects to provide. The Feld court stated that a land-
lord who offers a program of security owes his tenants a duty to use
"reasonable care under the circumstances." ' 7 5 This statement can lead to the
conclusion that if a landlord undertakes to provide a program of secur-
formance clearly has begun, there is no doubt that duty of care exists). In addi-
tion, the conclusion that a duty is activated when a security system has been
installed may be inferred from the Feld court's statement that a landlord incurs a
duty if he "provides a program of security." See 506 Pa. at 394, 485 A.2d at 747
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
171. For a general discussion of the issue of justifiable reliance, see W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, § 56, at 378-82.
172. See 506 Pa. at 393, 485 A.2d at 747. The Feld court stated that com-
ment a to § 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is "relevant in a situation ...
where a landlord undertakes to secure the areas within his control and possibly
fosters reliance by his tenants on his efforts." Id. It is submitted that by raising
rent and installing security devices a landlord would create reliance by the ten-
ant that the security devices will be adequately maintained, and that the only way
to diminish such reliance would be by adjusting rent if the security is discontin-
ued. See Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (portion of tenant's rent used for security created landlord's con-
tractual responsibility to maintain security).
173. See 506 Pa. at 394, 485 A.2d at 747 (court stated that tenant may rely
upon program within reasonable expectations of program and may not expect
more than is offered).
174. See, 506 Pa. at 393, 485 A.2d at 747 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 323 comment a (1965) ("[this section of the restatement] is ... relevant
in a situation ... where a landlord undertakes to secure areas within his control
and possibly fosters a reliance by his tenants on his efforts").
175. 506 Pa. at 394, 485 A.2d at 747 (emphasis added). For a further dis-
cussion of the Feld court's decision, see supra notes 114-134 and accompanying
text.
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ity, he must do so reasonably in order to reduce the risk of forseeable
crime.1 76 Such a conclusion is further supported by Justice Zappala's
concurring opinion, which states that "[l]iability is to be imposed only
where the measures taken by the landlord either are unreasonable to
reduce the risk of harm or have the effect of increasing the risk of
harm." 17 7 However, if this is what the court intended, the court failed
to give any guidelines regarding how it would define forseeability 178 or
how it would determine whether a program of security was adequate in
light of a foreseeable risk.
Conversely, it is suggested that the majority opinion in Feld can lead
to the conclusion that a landlord who provides a program of security
merely must operate with reasonable care whatever program of security
he offers, even if it is inadequate. 179 This conclusion is supported by
the court's statements that a tenant may justifiably rely on a program of
security only within the reasonable expectations of the program,' 80 and
that the tenant "can only expect the benefits reasonably expected of the
program as offered."' 8 '
IV. CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has already recognized that in the
modern landlord-tenant relationship the tenant is in need of legal pro-
tection.1 82 The court, therefore, has held that the warranty of habitabil-
ity is implied in every residential lease. 18 3
It is suggested that in holding that a landlord has no general duty to
176. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 19, at 173-94 (stan-
dard to act as reasonable person requires individual to do what is necessary or
what ideal individual would do in light of surrounding circumstances).
177. 506 Pa. at 403, 485 A.2d at 751 (Zappala, J., concurring).
178. For a discussion of how other courts have defined foreseeability in this
context, see supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
179. See 506 Pa. at 394, 485 A.2d at 747 (tenant may justifiably rely on pro-
gram of security only within reasonable expectations of the program offered).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 467-
68, 329 A.2d 812, 820-21 (1974) (quotingJavins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.) ("when American city dwellers, both rich and poor,
seek 'shelter' today, they seek a well known package of goods and services-a
package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat,
light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors,
proper sanitation and proper maintenance."), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970));
Reitmeyer v. Specher, 431 Pa. 284, 290, 243 A.2d 395, 398 (1968) ("No longer
does the average prospective tenant occupy a free bargaining status and no
longer do the average landlord-to-be and tenant-to-be negotiate a lease on an
'arm's length' basis."). For a discussion of the reasoning supporting Penn-
sylvania's decision that tenants are in need of protection, see supra notes 30-33
and accompanying text.
183. See Pugh, 486 Pa. 272, 284, 405 A.2d 897, 906. For a discussion of
Pugh, see supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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protect his tenants from criminal intrusion unless he decides to provide
security services, the Feld court has taken a position inconsistent with
Pennsylvania landlord-tenant law. 18 4 While it is understandable that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was concerned that the imposition of a
general duty of protection would make landlords insurers of their ten-
ants' safety, 1 85 and thus would deter landlords from providing housing
in less affluent areas, it is submitted that the court took a step backward
in Feld and left tenants of urban multiple-unit dwellings unnecessarily
vulnerable to criminal assault. 186
It is submitted that the best way to balance the interests of landlords
and tenants and society's need for adequate, safe housing is to impose a
clear duty on landlords to provide basic security measures, such as secure
locks on doors and windows, proper lighting, and possibly a buzzer or
magnetic card entry system at the building's entrance. While this duty
could be imposed either judicially or legislatively, the latter method has
the advantage of giving landlords notice of the pending bill and a chance
to procure new equipment and insurance before the duty is imposed. 18 7
It is submitted that this limited duty will prevent landlords from becom-
ing insurers of their tenants' safety and will also provide tenants with
basic security. Of course, market forces may encourage a landlord to
provide more comprehensive security measures, especially in affluent
housing markets.' 8 8 If a landlord chooses to do this, it is submitted that
he could then be held liable in tort based on an assumption of duty
theory. ' 89
Moreover, it is submitted that these basic security devices should be
considered part of the implied warranty of habitability, so that a tenant
184. See Feld v. Merriam, 314 Pa. Super. 414, 427, 461 A.2d 225, 231
(1983), rev'd, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742 (1984). The imposition on landlords of
a duty of protection is consistent with current trends in landlord-tenant law in
Pennsylvania. 314 Pa. Super. at 427, 461 A.2d at 231.
185. For a discussion of the supreme court's fear that the imposition of the
superior court's holding in Feld could make a landlord an insurer of his tenants'
safety, see supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text.
186. See Comment, supra note 66, at 1109 ("There is no doubt that apart-
ment dwellers are in need of greater protection in their buildings."). For a dis-
cussion of the changes in Pennsylvania law from which the Feld court retreated,
see supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
187. Note, Responsibility of Landlords for Criminal Acts of Third Persons, 48
N.C.L. REV. 713, 718 (1970) (resolution of this problem may require type of
intensive study that only legislature can provide).
188. See Feld, 506 Pa. at 393-94, 485 A.2d at 749. The Feld court noted that
landlords sometimes provide security measures in order to attract new tenants
and keep old ones. Id.
189. For a discussion of the assumption of duty theory, see supra notes 99-
106 and accompanying text. The assumption of duty theory would apply here
because even though the landlord would only have a duty to provide a basic
level of security, he could be held liable for not properly maintaining any addi-
tional security he decided to provide. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 323 & comment a (1965).
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can use contract remedies to compel a landlord to fix a malfunctioning
security device. 190 This would give tenants a means to take action
before a crime occurs, thereby preventing crime and reducing the land-
lord's potential tort liability. Finally, it is suggested that the imposition
on landlords of a duty to provide basic security measures would be the
least costly and most efficient way for landlords of urban multi-unit
dwellings to protect tenants from criminal intrusion without becoming
subject to unlimited liability. Such a solution would offer adequate pro-
tection for tenants, and would not discourage individuals who have the
necessary resources from performing the important social function of
providing housing.
John P. McLaughlin
190. See generally Haines, supra note 11, at 354-55 ("Tenants should be able
to avail themselves of contract or tort remedies in asserting their rights to rea-
sonable protection."). For a discussion of the contract remedies available in
Pennsylvania under the warranty of habitability, see supra note 84.
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